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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS--DOMICIL FOR PURPOSES OF INCOME TAXATION
-ABSENCE OF FIXED INTENT TO REMAIN IN RESIDENCE OR
TO RETURN TO DOMICIL OF ORIGIN
A District of Columbia statute1 levied a tax upon the incomes of all
domiciliaries. Petitioner moved to the District from Iowa in 1936 to take a
civil service position. The Board of Tax Appeals found that she did not have
in 1936, and had never since formed, an intent to abandon her domicil in
Iowa, and that in the tax year 1945-46 she neither had a fixed intent to
remain for the rest of her life in the District of Columbia, nor a fixed intent
to return to Iowa. Held (2-1), petitioner is domiciled in the District of
Columbia and subject to the income tax. Arbaugh v. District of Columbia,
176 F. 2d 28 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
A person's domicil is his permanent home,2 and once established it
remains his domicil until he adopts a new one.3 Two elements must concur
for the adoption of a new domicil: presence in the new place,4 add animus
imanendi-the intent to make one's home there.5 The English and early
American rule required intent to live there permanently for the adoption
of a new domicil. Presence in the new place for a temporary purpose could
not result in a change of domicil; an intent to return to the former domicil
at a later date, or the animus revertendi, would prevent the new residence
1. D. C. CODE § 47-1502 (1940).
2. A person's domicil is also defined as the place "where he has his true, fixed, per-
manent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has
the intention of returning (animus revertendi)." STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (8th ed.,
Bigelow, 1883); 17 Amr. JuR., Domicil § 2 (1938) ; 28 C. J. S., Domicil § 1 (1941). A
more precise definition is "the place with which a person has settled connection for certain
legal purposes, either because his home is there, or because that place is assigned to him
by law." RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 9 (1934); 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 9.1 (1935). An example of a domicil assigned by law is the domicil of origin, which is
the domicil of a legitimate child's father or an illegitimate child's mother at the time of
the child's brith. See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 30-33 (1937) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAws §§ 21-23, 31, 33 (2d ed. 1938).
3. Ex parte Weissinger, 247 Ala. 113, 22 So. 2d 510 (1945); Harris v. Harris, 205
Iowa 108, 215 N. W. 661 (1927).
4. In re Jones' Estate, 192 Iowa 78, 182 N. W. 227 (1921); White v. Tennant, 31
W. Va. 790, 8 S. E. 596 (1888) ; 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15.2 (1935) ; Note, 5
A. L. R. 296 (1920). But ef. Bangs v. Inhabitants of Brewster, 111 Mass. 382 (1873). An
exception to the rule is that where a person leaves his domicil of choice to return to his
domicil of origin, there is an immediate change of domicil back to the domicil of origin
without the person's presence there. Allen v. Thomason, 30 Tenn. 536 (1851); STORY,
CONFLICT OF LAws § 47 (8th ed., Bigelow, 1883). Few American jurisdictions have ac-
cepted this exception to the general rule. See, e.g., In re Jones' Estate, supra.
5. Brown v. Hall, 385 Ill. 260, 52 N. E. 2d 781 (1944) ; Ruth & Clark, Inc. v. Emery,
233 Iowa 1234, 11 N. W. 2d 397 (1943): Howe v. Howe, 179 Va. 111; 18 S. E. 2d 294
(1942) ; 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.1 (1935).
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from becoming the domicil. 6 In America, where it is not uncommon for a
person to have several homes during the course of life, there has been a
gradual change of view as to the intent required for a change of domicil.
In 1834, Story stated that a person's new residence may become his domicil
even though he has a "floating" intention to return to his former domicil at
some indefinite future date.7 The rule subsequently developed that the acquisi-
tion of a new residence with the intent to live there for an indefinite time
and without any fixed and definite intent to return to the former domicil
results in a change of domicil.8
The rule that intent to return to the former domicil will prevent the new
residence from becoming the domicil may perhaps be regarded as another
statement of the rule that a temporary absence from the domicil will not
result in a change of domicil. In cases where the new residence is temporary
in nature, it is not necessary in order to prevent a change of domicil, that
there be an intent to return to the domicil at an exact future time.9 In cases
where the new residence is not temporary in nature, the probable reason for
the rule is that a definite intent to return to the former domicil precludes
the intent to adopt the new residence as a fixed and permanent home. With
the relaxation of the requirement of an intent to remain permanently in the
new place in order to adopt a new domicil, there has been a consequent
greater degree of certainty required to show the anines revertendi. To rebut
the showing of an intention to remain indefinitely in the new residence, an
intent to return to the domicil at a relatively fixed and definite time must
be shown. 10 The intent with regard to the old domicil becomes important
only for the purpose of defeating the adoption of a new domicil after a prima
facie change of domicil has been established."
6. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (1st ed. 1834). This requirement has
often been expressed negatively by saying that the new residence becomes the domicil if
the person is living there without any present intention of removing therefrom. Williamson
v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 442, 58 L. Ed. 758 (1914) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 25 (2d ed. 1938).
7. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 46 (8th ed., Bigelow, 1883). The rule is usually applied
in cases involving long residence in the new place. Mitchell v. Delaware State Tax Comm'r,
42 Del. 589, 42 A. 2d 19 (Super. Ct. 1945); Firth v. Firth, 50 N. J. Eq. 137, 24 At. 916
(Ch. 1892). But cf. Shenton v. Abbott, 178 Md. 526, 15 A. 2d 906 (1940).
8. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 442, 58 L. Ed. 758 (1914);
Ellison v. Smoot's Adm'r, 286 Ky. 768, 151 S. W. 2d 1017 (1941); State-Planters Bank
v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 289, 6 S. E. 2d 629 (1940) ; Sutton v. Sutton, 128 W. Va. 290,
36 S. E. 2d 608 (1945).
9. Ex parte Weissenger, 247 Ala. 113, 22 So. 2d 510 (1945) ; Howe v. Howe, 179
Va. 111, 18 S. E. 2d 294 (1942). Where tvo persons left North Car6lina and went to
Nevada to obtain a divorce, intending to return immediately to North Carolina, they were
'held to have never lost their domicil in North Carolina. State v. Williams, 224 N. E. 183,
29 S. E. 2d 744 (1944), aff'd sub norn. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 65
Sup. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577 (1945) (prosecution for bigamy). But ef. Goodloe v. Hawk,
113 F. 2d 753 (D. C. Cir. 1940) (alternative ground).
10. Mitchell v. Delaware State Tax Comm'r, 42 Del. 589, 42 A. 2d 19 (Super. Ct.
1945); Sparks v. Sparks, 114 Tenn. 666, 88 S. W. 173 (1905).
11. District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U. S. 441, 62 Sup. Ct. 303, 86 L. Ed. 329
(1941). Whre . domiciliary of New Jersey left that state with the absolute intent to
abandon it as his domicil and to live in another state if he could find a job there, but did
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The strictness with which the requisites for domicil are adhered to
depends to some extent upon the purpose for which the change of domicil
is sought to be shown. It has been said that the concept of domicil is merely
a tool which the courts use in dealing with a variety of situations.12 In
determining what law applies to the distribution of a decedent's personal
property, a comparatively vague animus revertendi has been held to be
sufficient to prevent a new residence from becoming the domicil."3 Where
the question is whether there is diversity of citizenship or jurisdiction to grant
divorce, even a strong intent to return to the domicil of origin may not
prevent the acquisition of new domicil. For example, a soldier on war-time
duty in Louisiana married a girl who was domiciled in Louisiana and lived
there with her for a short time; he was held to be domiciled in Louisiana
for divorce purposes. 14 But the result might well have been different had
he claimed the right to vote in Louisiana on the ground that he was domiciled
there.
Statutes often make "residence" the basis for income taxation 15 and the
courts have usually construed "residence" in such statutes to mean "legal
residence," or domicil.16 But it is not unreasonable to impose property and
income taxes on persons who reside there for several years, even if they
are not domiciled there.'7 In many fact situations, in which it is doubtful
whether residents would be held to be domiciliaries for some purposes, they
have been held subject to the tax statutes. It was held in one tax case that
there was a change of domicil although the person had never been physically
present in the new domicil, but had merely sent his wife there with his
property.'8 In District of Columbia v. Murphy,19 the United States Supreme
Court, construing the same statute as that involved in the instant case, held that
not succeed in finding a job, it was held that he had not lost his New Jersey domicil.
The intent to abandon the old domicil did not lead to a finding of the intent to adopt a
new home. Sprague v. Sprague, 141 N. J. Eq. 104, 23 A. 2d 810 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
12. 3 PROCEEDINGS A. L. I. 226-31 (1925) ; STRUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 35 (1937).
13. Shenton v. Abbott, 178 Md. 526, 15 A. 2d 906 (1940).
14. Burgan v. Burgan, 207 La. 1057, 22 So. 2d 649 (1945) ; cf. Goodloe v, Hawk,
113 F. 2d 753 (D. C. Cir. 1940) ; Sutton v. Sutton, 128 W. Va. 290, 36 S. E. 2d 608
(1945). For discussions of the problems involved in divorces between persons whose
domicil is doubtful, see Goodrich, Five Years of Conflict of Laws, 32 VA. L. REV. 295,
297 (1946) ; Powell, And Repent at Leisure, An Inquiry Into the Unhappy Lot of Those
Whom Nevada Hath Joined Together and North Carolina Hath Pitt Asunder, 58 HAv.
L. REv. 930 (1945).
15. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 51, § 373 (1940) ; ARiz. CODE ANN. § 73-1502 (1939);
GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3103 (1933). The statute in the instant case expressly makes domicil
instead of residence the basis of taxation. Supra Note 1.
16. Mitchell v. Delaware State Tax Comm'r, 42 Del. 589, 42 A. 2d 19 (Super. Ct.
1945) ; see Beale, Residence and Donicil, 4 IOWA L. BULL. 3 (1918).
17. It has been held that the imposition of a tax by a state upon the income of a non-
resident earned within the state is not a deprivation of property without due process of
law. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed. 445 (1920); 27 Am.
JuL., Income Taxes §§ 189-93 (1940). For an analysis of cases involving the constitutional-
ity of state income tax statutes as applied to non-residents, see Note, 64 L. Ed. 445 (1920).
18. Bangs v. Inhabitants of Brewstei, 111 Mass. 382 (1873).
19. 314 U. S. 441, 62 Sup. Ct. 303, 86 L. Ed. 329 (1941).
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the fact of residence in the District of Columbia raises a presumption of domicil
there, which can be rebutted only by evidence stronger than that of a senti-
mental connection with the former domicil.
The instant case may be an important landmark in the development
of more liberal rules governing changes of domicil; or it may be restricted
to cases involving income taxation, since the concept of domicil is merely
the means and not the end in the decision of cases in which it is involved.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-VALIDITY OF
STATE TAX UPON GROSS RECEIPTS OF SEGMENT OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Petitioner, a Delaware corporation, operated oil pipe lines lying wholly
in Mississippi. The pipe lines were used to transport oil from oil fields to
loading racks, where it was loaded into railroad tank cars for interstate ship-
ment. Respondent, Mississippi tax commissioner, levied a tax on the privilege
of doing an intrastate business, measured by a percentage of gross income.'
Petitioner sought review of this action, on the ground that the tax was un-
constitutional as a tax upon the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
Held (5-4) 2 affirming the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, that
the state has the power to impose such a tax, whether appellant's business is
intrastate or interstate. "The statute is not invalidated by the commerce clause
of the Federal Constitution merely because . . . it imposes a 'direct' tax on
the 'privilege' of engaging in interstate commerce." Since the tax is placed
upon activities conducted entirely within the state, it cannot be repeated by
any other state, and apportionment is unnecessary. Interstate Oil Pipe Line
Co. v. Stone, 69 Sup. Ct. 1264 (1949).
The commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, 3 by delegating to
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, is held to limit state
power of regulation and taxation in that same sphere. 4 Until 1938, it had
been a fairly settled doctrine of constitutional law that a state tax upon the
privilege of engaging in interstate, commerce5 or upon the gross receipts of
1. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 10105-09 (Supp. 1948).
2. Opinion by Rutledge, J. (Black, Douglas & Murphy, JJ., joining); concurring
opinion by Burton, J.; dissenting opinion by Reed, J. (Vinson, C. J., and Frankfurter
& Jackson, JJ., joining).
3. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
4. ROTTSc HAEFER, THE CONSTITUTION AND SocIo-EcoNoMIc CHANGE 96, 107 (1948);
Landis, The Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Taxation, 20 Micu. L. REv.
50 (1921).
5. "The tax is one upon the privilege or right to do business . . . and if appellant
is engaged only in interstate commerce it is conceded, as it must be, that the tax, so
far as appellant is concerned, constitutionally cannot be imposed." Ozark Pipe Line Co.
v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 562, 45 Sup. Ct. 184, 69 L. Ed. 439 (1925); Alpha Portland
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a foreign corporation engaged in interstate commerce was repugnant to the
commerce clause. The decisions reaching this conclusion used the long-familiar
language that such a tax was invalid because it imposed a "direct burden"
upon interstate commerce. 7 With the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the Western Live Stock case,8 however, a new theory was introduced
by which to test the validity of local gross receipts taxes, the so-called
"cumulative" or "multiple burden" test.9 In that case a state privilege tax,
levied upon the gross receipts from the sale of advertising in newspapers and
magazines distributed among several states, was held valid because it was
incapable of being repeated by other states so as to subject a single interstate
transaction to multiple tax burdens. 10 Since that decision the Court has wound
its way through a maze of cases involving state taxes on the gross receipts
derived from interstate transportation, 11 interstate sales, 12 and the manufac-
Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477, 69 L. Ed. 916, 44 A. L. R.
1219 (1925) ; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 11 Sup. Ct. 851, 35 L. Ed. 649 (1891).
6. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U. S. 90, 58 Sup. Ct. 72,
82 L. Ed. 68 (1937) ; Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U. S. 650, 56 Sup. Ct.
608, 80 L. Ed. 956 (1936); Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, 38 Sup.
Ct. 126, 62 L. Ed. 295 (1917); Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217,
28 Sup. Ct. 638, 52 L. Ed. 1031 (1908) ; ROTTSCHAEFER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 112-113.
Note that such a tax has generally been held invalid, whether "imposed upon," or merely"measured by," the gross receipts.
The commerce clause does not prohibit state taxation of the net income from inter-
state or foreign commerce, United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S.
321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135 (1918). Nor does it forbid a state to tax the gross
receipts from intrastate commerce, Ohio River & W. Ry. v. Dittey, 232 U. S. 576, 34
Sup. Ct. 372, 58 L. Ed. 737 (1914).
7. E.g., Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U. S. 90, 58 Sup. Ct.
72, 82 L. Ed. 68 (1937) ; Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U. S. 650, 56 Sup.
Ct. 608, 80 L. Ed. 956 (1936).
8. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 58 Sup. Ct. 546,
82 L. Ed. 823, 115 A. L. R. 944 (1938).
9. "The vice characteristic of those [local gross receipts taxes] which have been
held invalid is that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to
be capable, in point of substance, of being imposed . . . with equal right by every state
which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being done, so
that without the protection of the commerce clause it would bear cumulative burdens
not imposed on local commerce." Id. at 255-56.
10. "The tax is not one which in form or substance can be repeated by other states
in such manner as to lay an added burden on the interstate distribution of the magazine."
Id. at 260.
11. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 68 Sup. Ct. 1475, 92 L. Ed.
1832 (1948) (franchise tax measured by proportion of capital invested within the state
in interstate oil pipe line held valid); Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S.
653, 68 Sup. Ct. 1260, 92 L. Ed. 1633 (1948) (gross receipts tax on bus line lying partly
in other states held invalid where not apportioned by mileage within the taxing state) ;
Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422, 67 Sup. Ct. 815, 91 L. Ed.
993 (1947) (gross receipts tax on business of loading and unloading vessels moving
in interstate commerce held invalid).
12. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 67 Sup. Ct. 274, 91 L. Ed. 265 (1946) (tax
imposed by seller's state on proceeds of interstate sale of securities held invalid);
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 64 Sup. Ct. 1023, 88 L. Ed. 1304 (1944)
(tax by buyer's state upon interstate sale of goods held invalid) ; McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co,, 309 U. S. 33, 60 Sup. Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed. 565, 128 A. L. R. 876
(1940) (tax by buyer's state on proceeds of interstate sales held valid); Gwin, White
& Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 59 Sup. Ct. 325, 83 L. Ed. 272 (1939) (gross
receipts tax on business of marketing fruit shipped to places of sale in other states and
foreign countries held invalid).
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ture of goods intended for interstate shipment,13 and on specific license fees
for doing interstate business within the state. 14 Both the varied results of
these cases and the differences of opinion of the Justices in each decision
show that the "direct burden" and "multiple burden" doctrines continue to
be at ddds with one another.' 5 The cases suggest, however, that the states
may tax "local incidents" of interstate commerce if such taxes are not capable
of being repeated by other states; but they also suggest that the mere privilege
of engaging in commerce within the taxing state is not such a local incident.
The split over the test to be applied reaches its height in the present
case, where the vote stands 4-4 on the main issue, the "multiple burden"
theory becoming the opinion of the Court by virtue of Mr. Justice Burton's
concurrence on different grounds. The Mississippi Supreme Court had con-
strued the tax as placed upon the privilege of engaging in intrastate commerce,
and had upheld' it as applied to the Interstate Co. on the sole ground that
the operation of pipe lines between points within the state was intrastate
rather than ifiterstate commerce. 16 The United States Supreme Court,
accepting the state court's construction of the state statute, holds, neverthe-
less, that even if the pipe line business is assumed to be interstate commerce,
the tax is still valid, since there is no attempt to tax interstate activity
carried on outside of Mississippi, and no other state can repeat the tax.1 7
With this view the four dissenting Justices take sharp issue; holding that
13. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 82 L. Ed.
1365, 117 A. L. R. 429 (1938) (tax on gross receipts of manufacturer derived from
interstate sale of products held invalid).
14. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 66 Sup. Ct. 586, 90 L. Ed. 760, 162 A. L. R.
844 (1946) (license tax for privilege of engaging in business as solicitor held invalid
as applied to soliciting orders of goods to be shipped from other states).
15. RoTrsCHAEFER, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 112-25; Mendelson, Reccnt Developments
i; State Power to Regulate and Yax Interstate Commerce. 98 U. oF PA. L. REV. 57
(1949); Powell, New Light om Gross Receipts Taxes, 53 HARv. L. REV. 909 (1940);
Powell, More Ado about Gross Receipts Taxes, 60' HARv. L. REV. 501 (1947).
In the case of state taxes upon foreign, as opposed to interstate, commerce, there
is no opportunity for cumulative taxation, and the "multiple burden" theory cannot be
applied as the test of validity. In such cases the Court must examine whether the state
is taxing the privilege of conducting the business, or whether the tax imposes an undue
burden upon the commerce. See Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S.
422, 429, 433, 67 Sup. Ct. 815, 91 L. Ed. 993 (1947).
16. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 203 Miss. 715, 35 So. 2d 73 (1948).
17. Petitioner had pressed the argument that two earlier decisions of the Court,
where the validity of state taxes upon interstate oil pipe lines had been drawn in ques-
tion, were determinative of the issue in this case. Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier, 266
U. S. 555, 45 Sup. Ct. 184, 69 L. Ed. 439 (1925), held that an annual franchise tax,
apportioned by the amount of capital and surplus employed within the taxing state, was
invalid as a tax "upon the privilege or right to do business." Memphis Natural Gas Co.
v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 68 Sup. Ct. 1475, 92 L. Ed. 1832 (1948), held a similar tax
valid, accepting the state court's construction of the tax as not upon the privilege of
doing business, but as a recompense to the state for the protection of local activities of
the business. In its opinion the court reviewed the holding of the Monier case and cited
it with approval. Although the language of these two cases would apparently lead the
Court to a conclusion of unconstitutionality of the present tax, where it accepted the
"privilege" construction and assumed the commerce to be interstate, the opinion merely
by-passed these holdings and relied upon the old case of Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry.,
142 U. S. 217, 12 Sup. Ct. 121, 35 L. Ed. 994 (1891).
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the transportation of oil in this case is interstate commerce, they adopt the
long-accepted rule that "the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce
itself is immune from state taxation. This is because ... the commerce clause
of the Constitution does not leave to the states any power to permit or
refuse the carrying on of interstate commerce." 18 Although the dissent
is not expressly predicated upon the "direct burden" theory of previous
cases, it relies heavily upon those cases as the authority for its position.19
The result of the present case, naturally to be expected in the light of
Supreme Court cases of the past decade, 20 does little 'to settle the problem,
or to indicate the course likely to be pursued in'the future. In all such cases,
where Congress has declared no legislative policy, it is the problem of the
Court to resolve two conflicting principles of policy: 21 (1) that interstate
commerce should be protected from undue interference by state taxation,
and (2) that for the benefits bestowed upon interstate commerce by the
states, it should be required to pay its share of the costs. Frequently in these
circumstances, the trend of court decisions is more significant than the
doctrines applied, and the "multiple burden" theory has lent renewed impetus
to the recent trend of allowing ever-widening scope to this area of state
taxation. 22 Summarizing in the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "To
attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past would neither clarify
what has gone before nor guide the future. Suffice it to say that especially
in this field opinions must be read in the setting of the particular cases and
as the product of preoccupation with their special facts." 23
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PEACEFUL PICKETING-POWER OF
STATE COURT TO ENJOIN
Plaintiffs, co-partners in the used car business, belonged to no union
themselves and had no employees. Defendant union engaged in peaceful
picketing of plaintiffs' establishment on behalf of an automobile salesmen's
union for the purpose of compelling plaintiffs to enter into a contract to
operate their business only during certain hours and days fixed by the
union. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin this picketing. Held, injunction granted. The
picketing was not a lawful exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech, but constituted unlawful coercion. The interests of the plaintiffs and
18. 69 Sup. Ct. at 1272-73.
19. See note 17 supra.
20. See note 15 supra. For another discussion of the present case, see 98 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 124 (1949).
21. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252, 67 Sup. Ct. 274, 91 L. Ed. 265
(1946).
22. ROTrSCHAEFER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 127.
23. Majority opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252, 67 Sup. Ct. 274,
91 L. Ed. 265 (1946).
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of the public outweigh the interest of the union in the welfare of a "mere
handful of members" in the used car business. Hanke v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, 207 P. 2d 206 (Wash. 1949), cert. granted,-U. S.-
(1949).
In 1940 the United States Supreme Court held that an Alabama criminal
statute prohibiting in general terms all picketing for the purpose of inter-
fering with a lawful business was invalid on its face as an unconstitutional
abridgment of the right of free speech.' By identifying peaceful picketing
with free speech the Court assumed jurisdiction to review all state action
limiting peaceful picketing and imposed upon itself the responsibility of
developing a new body of constitutional law.2 The Court's decisions since
the Thornhill case 3 leave considerable doubt as to the scope of the doctrine.4
The Thornhill case indicated that a state could forbid peaceful picketing
only in the case of "clear and present danger." 6 But the Ritter's Cafe and
Giboney cases held that a state court could constitutionally enjoin peaceful
picketing where the purpose of the picketing was contrary to the economic
policy of the state as announced by its legislature.6 In the Swing and Angelos
cases, however, the Court held that a state court could not on the basis of
the common law restrict picketing to disputes involving an employer and his
employees.
7
It is clear that the states may to some extent limit the right of peaceful
1. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940) ; cf.
Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 582, 84 L. Ed. 1104 (1940) (municipal
ordinance). For an indication of the state of the substantive law in regard to peacetul
picketing from Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077, 35 L. R. A. 722, 57
Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896) through Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct.
857, 81 L. Ed. 1229 (1937), see RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 765-68 (1939).
2. For arguments concerning the wisdom of the identification of peaceful picketing with
free speech see GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 334-69 (1949) ; Teller, Picketing and Free
Speech, 56 HARV. L. REv. 180 (1942); Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent,
56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943); Teller, Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply, 56 HARV.
L. REv. 532 (1943); Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41
MicH. L. REv. 1037 (1943).
3. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940) ; Carlson
v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 582, 84 L. Ed. 1104 (1940) ; Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 61 Sup. Ct. 551, 85 L. Ed. 836 (1941) ;
A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1941) ; Carpenters
& Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 62 Sup. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1154 (1942) ;
Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 62 Sup. Ct. 816, 86 L.
Ed. 1178 (1942) ; Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293, 64 Sup. Ct. 126,
88 L. Ed. 58 (1943) ; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 69 Sup. Ct. 684,
93 L. Ed. 649 (1949).
4. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 350-62 (1949).
5. "Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where the
clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to
test the merits of the ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion."
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. at 104.
6. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 69 Sup. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed.
649 (1949) : Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 62 Sup. Ct. 807,
86 L. Ed. 1154 (1942). But cf. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315
U. S. 769, 62 Sup. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942).
7. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293, 64 Sup. Ct. 126. 88 L. Ed.
58 (1943) ; A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1941).
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picketing.8 But even where the purpose of the picketing contravenes the
state's legislatively-defined policy, the power of a state court to prohibit
peaceful picketing is limited. In the Giboney case, the most recent Supreme
Court decision on the subject, the Court applied a "clear and present danger"
test; 9 but it is questionable whether this test is not in reality the "rational
basis" test traditionally applied to economic regulations.'0
The important question raised by the instant case is whether a state
court may evaluate the interests of the picketing group as against the interests
of the public and enjoin the picketing on the ground that its purpose is against
the policy of the state as a matter of common law." For the Supreme Court
to hold that a state court may do so might seem to be the next logical step
from the Giboney decision, although there are some indications in the Giboney
case that the Court will still insist upon a legislatively-defined policy.12 On
its facts* it would appear to be impossible to reconcile the Washington court's
decision in the instant case with the Swing and Angelos cases.' 3 And, if this
"next logical step" should be taken, the Thornhill doctrine that peaceful
picketing is free speech will have lost its practical significance.
1 4
8. "The right of the state to determine whether the common interest is best served
by imposing some restrictions upon the use of weapons for inflicting economic injury in
the struggle of conflicting industrial forces has not previously been doubted." Carpenters
& Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 725, 62 Sup. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1154 (1942).
For a good discussion of legislative problems in drafting such restrictive legislation in the
light of Supreme Court decisions see Note, Regulations of Picketing and Free Speech, 26
TEXAS L. REv. 783 (1948).
9. "There was clear danger, imminent and immediate, that unless restrained, appel-
lants would succeed in making that policy [of the state against combinations in restraint of
trade] a dead letter insofar as purchases by nonunion men were concerned." Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. at 503.
10. Compare Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, 47 Sup. Ct. 86, 71 L. Ed. 248 (1926),
u'ith Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732, 81 L. Ed. 1066 (1937). The
Giboney case, 336 U. S. at 503, cites with approval the language of Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 776. 62
Sup. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942): "'Picketing by an organized group is more than
free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence
of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature
of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it the
subject of restrictive regulation.'"
11. See 49 COL. L. REv. 711 (1949), for a discussion of the unlawful purpose test as
applied by state courts in picketing cases since the Thornhill case.
12. "'The conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in it can-
not continue their struggle without danger to the community. But it is not for judges...
to set the limits of permissible contest.... This is the function of the legislature.'" Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. at 499 (quotation from the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Brandeis in Duplex v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 448, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed.
349 (1921). Throughout the opinion the Court speaks in terms of "legislative power,"
"legislative control," and "clearly adopted state policy."
13. See 207 P. 2d at 214 (dissenting opinion).
14. "It is hard to understand the Court's present position as being anything but a re-
treat from the Thornhill case, and this can mean only that the majority no longer believe
peaceful picketing to be free speech-the dissemination of information-and nothing
more." GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 361 (1949).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF COURT TO PUNISH FOR DIRECT
CONTEMPT-OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN COUNSEL
Petitioner was served with a subpoena duces tecum commanding him
to appear before the grand jury with certain papers admittedly in his posses-
sion disclosing the membership of a secret organization which was being
investigated. He appeared without these paperi and refused to deliver them
while before the grand jury. He was thereupon taken into court where the
judge who impanelled the grand jury ordered him to appear with these papers.
Petitioner again refused and was sentenced to jail until such time as he would
comply with the court order. From this sentence, petitioner seeks certiorari.
Held (4-2),' writ denied; petitioner was not deprived of due process of law
uhder the state or Federal Constitution by the failure of the trial judge to
allow him further hearing and opportunity to secure counsel. Morris v. Morris,
42 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1949).
It is almost universally recognized that courts have the inherent power
to punish for contempt,2 although in some states the mode of procedure is
governed by statutory3 or constitutional 4provisions. While as a general rule
contempts are classified into two categories, civil and criminal, the line of
demarcation between the two is at times difficult to determine.5 The distinc-
tion drawn by most authorities is that civil contempts are coercive and remedial
in nature, while criminal contempts are penal.0 Under this rule the contempt
in the principal case would appear to be civil, because the commitment of the
petitioner to jail was a coercive, not a punitive, measure.
The most important factor for consideration in determining the power of
1. Per curiam opinion; dissent by Lawson, J. (Livingstone, J., concurring).
2. "That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, has been many
times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of
justice." Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 65, 45 Sup. Ct. 18, 69 L. Ed. 162
(1924) ; accord, Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (1909) ; In re Hayes, 200 N. C.
133, 156 S. E. 791 (1931) ; Winfree v. State, 175 Tenn. 427, 135 S. W. 2d 454 (1940) ; 4
BL. Comm.* 283-88; Note, 31 COL. L. REV. 956 (1931).
3. E.g., ARK. DIG. STAT. § 34-903 (1947); IOWA CODE § 665.7 (1946); Mo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 2030 (1939). For a collection of state statutes governing the mode of pro-
cedure in contempt cases, see THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 47, Appendix
B (1934).
4. OKLA. CONST. Art. II, § 25.
5. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258, 67 Sup. Ct.
677, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947) ; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup.
Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797 (191) ; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 Sup. Ct.
665, 48 L. Ed. 997 (1904) ; THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 3 (1934) ; Note,
13 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 356, 358 (1945). In answer to a question propounded by defene
counsel for the United Mine Workers of America during contempt proceeding before
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Judge Goldsborough
remarked: "If you knov the exact difference between civil and criminal contempt you
are the only person in the United States who does." N. Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1946. p. 2, col. 2,
6. Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U. S. 217, 52 Sup. Ct. 315, 76 L. Ed. 715 (1932) ; Ex parle
Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 45 Sup. Ct. 332, 69 L. Ed. 527 (1925) ; In rc Nevitt, 117 Fed.
448, 458 (8th Cir. 1902) ; Porter v. Alexenburg, 396 Ill. 57, 71 N. E. 2d 58 (1947) ; Tabor
v. Commonwealth ex rel. Peterson, 303 Ky. 810, 199 S. W. 2d 613 (1947) ; Dahl v. Dahl,
210 Minn. 361, 298 N. W. 361 (1941); Roanoke Waterworks Co. v. Roanoke Glass Co.,
151 Va. 229, 144 S. E. 460 (1928) ; THOMAS, PROBLEIfS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 2 (1934).
[ VOL. 3
RECENT CASES
the court to punish summarily for contempt, however, is not whether the
contempt was civil or criminal but whether it was committed in the presence
of the court. 7 As a general rule the court is deemed to be present in every
portion of the place set apart for its use and for the use of its officers, jurors
and witnesses.8 When a contempt is committed in the court's presence it is
called direct, and by the weight of authority the court has power to punish
without a separate hearing and opportunity to secure counsel.9 However,
in the case of an indirect contempt, i.e., one committed outside the facie
curiae, the prevailing view is that there should be a hearing.' 0 In some states
the right to a hearing and to counsel in indirect contempt cases is based on
common-law or statutory rules of procedure," while in others this right is
guaranteed by the constitution.
2
Even where the contempt is direct, if the party charged with the reprehen-
sible action claims to have a valid defense, such as the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination, by the better view he must be given an opportunity
to state the basis for his defense or justify his position before punishment
can be meted out by the court.'3 So also where there is a legitimate dispute
as to the facts, and where they are not within the personal knowledge of the
judge, there should be a hearing and an opportunity to secure counsel.' 4
7. E.g., Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 536, 45 Sup. Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 767
(1925) ; Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 9 Sup. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed. 405 (1888).
8. Ex parte Savin, 131 U. S. 267, 277, 9 Sup. Ct. 699, 33 L. Ed. 150 (1889) ; Lockett
v. State, 145 Ark. 415, 224 S. W. 952 (1920) ; Harding v. McCullough, 236 Iowa 556,
19 N. W. 2d 302 (1939) ; Beach v. Beach, 79 Ohio App. 397, 74 N. E. 2d 130 (1946).
9. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63 L. Ed. 656 (1919) ; Ex Parte
Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 9 Sup. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed. 405 (1888) ; White v. George, 195 Ga. 465,
24 S. E. 2d 787 (1943) ; In re Na Lepa, 298 Mich. 310, 199 N. W. 89 (1941) ; People v.
Higgins, 173 Misc. 96, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1939); see Notes, 13 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 346 (1945), 27 VA. L. REV. 665 (1941), 57 A. L. R. 545 (1928).
10. Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 45 Sup. Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 767 (1925);
Ex parte Savin, 131 U. S. 267, 9 Sup. Ct. 699, 33 L. Ed. 150 (1889) ; People v. Rosenthal,
370 Ill. 244, 18 N. E. 2d 450 (1938) ; Charles Cushman Co. v. Mackey, 135 Me. 490, 200
At. 505 (1938) ; Note, 57 A. L. R. 545 (1928) ; 29 GEO. L. J. 917 (1941).
11. ARK. DIG. STAT. § 34-903 (1947), Lee v. State, 102 Ark. 122, 143 S. W. 909 (1912)
Kneisel v. Ursus Motor Co., 323 Ill. 452, 154 N. E. 195 (1926) ; Smilay v. Oakland Cir-
cuit Judge, 235 Mich. 151, 209 N. W. 191 (1926) ; Mo. R-v. STAT. ANN. § 2030 (1939),
Bender v. Young, 252 S. W. 691 (Mo. 1923).
12. OKLA. CONST. Art. II, § 25, Ex parte Dawes, 31 Okla. Crim. App. 406, 239 Pac.
689 (1925), Ex Parte Sullivan, 10 Okla. Crim. App. 465, 138 Pac. 815 (1914).
13. Ex parte Berman, 105 Cal. App. 37, 287 Pac. 125 (1930) ; People v. Zazove, 311
I1. 198, 142 N. E. 543 (1924) ; accord, State ex tel Cheadle v. District Court, 92 Mont.
94, 10 P. 2d 586 (1932) ; Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S. E. 2d 352
(1943). But cf. White v. George, 195 Ga. 465, 24 S. E. 2d 787 (1943). A case very similar
to the principal case is Coyle v. Sawyer, 198 Iowa 1022, 200 N. W. 721, 723 (1924), where
the court says: "The conduct of the petitioner and the language used unmistakably in-
dicate that he would not comply, and that he was ready to be punished for contempt, if his
act was so considered by the trial judge. This in itself constituted a waiver of his right to
be heard in further explanation or excuse of his conduct. He did make an oral explana-
tion. Nothing would have been effectuated by a further opportunity to explain, and a
rule to show cause would have been an idle ceremony not exacted or contemplated by
the law under the circumstances."
14. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 49 Sup. Ct. 471, 73 L. Ed. 938 (1929)
(shadowing jurors after adjournment of court for the day) ; EX parte Savin, 131 U. S.
267, 277, 9 Sup. Ct. 699, 33 L. Ed. 150 (1889) (attempting to bribe a witness in court
corridors) ; In re Creely, 8 Cal. App. 713, 97 Pac. 766 (1908) (shouting at jury while
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In the instant case petitioner's defense was that he was an officer of the
secret organization and had taken an oath not to disclose the identity of the
members. But the court correctly ruled that the information requested was
a proper subject for the grand jury's investigation and held that petitioner
had no constitutional privilege to refuse to produce it.15
Proper procedure in contempt cases should be controlled by considera-
tions of fairness. In the instant case petitioner was accorded an adequate
opportunity to state his defense after having refused to obey the judge's
oral command and a subpoena duces tecum to bring certain corporate records
before the grand jury. His defense being properly overruled, petitioner's
continued refusal to comply with the court order constituted contempt, and
the court was justified in summarily imposing punishment.16
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC TESTS-HARGER DRUNK-
OMETER TEST TO DETERMINE INTOXICATION
Defendant was indicted on a charge of negligent homicide. Soon after
the accident he had voluntarily submitted to a test using the Harger Drunk-
ometer for the purpose of determining intoxication. Over defendant's objection
testimony was admitted at the trial concerning the results of the test and the
deductions drawn therefrom as to his being under the influence of intoxicating
liquor at the time of the accident. From a conviction, defendant brings error.
Held, reversed. There being no evidence in the record showing general scien-
tific acceptance of the probative value of the Harger Drunkometer, it was
error to admit the testimony. People v. Morse, 38 N. W. 2d 322 (Mich. 1949).
Evidence obtained from the use of scientific devices is inadmissible unless
there is general scientific recognition of their probative value.' Expert testi-
jury was being taken from hotel to juryroom during recess) ; Field v. Thornell, 106 Iowa
7, 75 N. W. 685 (1898) (editor attempted to influence jurors by showing them editorial at
newspaper office after court adjourned for the day); People v. Higgins, 173 Misc. 96,
16 N. Y. S. 2d 302, 309 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (sheriff assigned to guard jury purchased liquor and
had improper relations with woman juror).
15. "[A]n officer of a corporation in whose custody are its books and papers is given
no right to object to the production of the corporate records because they may disclose his
guilt. He does not hold them in his private capacity and is not, therefore, protected against
their production or against a writ requiring him as agent of the corporation to produce
them.' * Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151, 158, 43 Sup. Ct. 514, 67 L, Ed. 917
(1923) ; In re Verser-Clay Co., 98 F. 2d 859 (10th Cir. 1938) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§
2200, 2259a, 2259b, (3d. ed. 1940) ; Note 120 A. L. R. 1102 (1939).
16. The dissent in the instant case, to sustain the position that there was a lack of pro-
cedural due process, cited the recent case of It re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 275, 68 Sup. Ct.
499, 92 L. Ed. 682 (1948). But the Oliver case is easily distinguishable from the usual
contempt case, because there the Supreme Court was reviewing a contempt conviction
under Michigan's unique one-man grand jury and judge system. In this connection see
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.943-28.946 (1938).
1. Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. Cir. 1923) ; State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz.
276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937) ; People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503, 139 A. L. R.
1171 (1942) ; People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 913 (County Ct. 1938), aff'd,
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mony based on scientific tests can be very convincing to a jury,2 and therefore
the tests on which such testimony is based should be scientifically reliable.
The courts feel that it is for stientists to determine the soundness of new
developments in their field, since they are best fitted for that purpose. When
a new scientific development is accorded the requisite recognition, the courts
admit evidence obtained from its use.
3
The Harger Drunkometer is a machine which uses the breath for the
determination of the alcoholic content of the blood. The subject breathes
into the apparatus and certain chemicals contained therein react to the alcohol
in the breath. A comparison of the weights of the chemical before and after
the test is said to reveal the amount of alcohol in the subject's blood.4 It is
generally recognized by the medical profession and hence by the courts that
a certain amount of alcohol in the blood is indicative of an ascertainable
degree of intoxication in most people.5 Chemical analysis of the blood or
urine has been recognized as being a reliable method of determining the
alcoholic content of the blood.6 In the instant case there was such conflicting
testimony as to the reliability of the Harger Drunkometer as to preclude any
finding of general scientific acceptance of the apparatus. Indeed, the medical
periodicals reveal that there is no general scientific acceptance of the device
at this time."
Law enforcement officers have found evidence interpreting the result
of'chemical analysis of the blood or urine very helpful in prosecutions for
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.8
But the use of these tests has raised serious legal problems.9 One of the
problems involved concerns the privilege against self-incrimination. The
279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31, 119 A. L. R. 1198 (1938); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651,
246 N. W. 314, 86 A. L. R. 611 (1933) ; 37 MIcH. L. REv. 1141 (1939).
2. Inbau, Detection of Deception Technique Admitted as Evidence, 26 J. Crm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 262, 268 (1936).
3. See State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314, 317, 86 A. L. R. 611, 615 (1933);
37 HARv. L. REv. 1138 (1924).
4. State v. Hunter, 68 A. 2d 274 (N. J. 1949) ; Harger, Lamb, and Hulpieu, A Rapid
Chemical Test for Intoxication Employing Breath, 110 A. M. A. J. 779 (1938).
5. This has generally been conceded or assumed in cases reaching the appellate courts.
Objection to the evidence may be based on grounds other than its probative value. See in
this connection, State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937) ; Touchton v. State,
154 Fla. 547, 18 So. 2d 752 (1944) ; Spitler v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46 N. E. 2d 591 (1943).
For discussions of the standard set up for interpreting the results of chemical analysis of
body fluids for alcoholic content, see Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 Ky.
L. J. 250 (1946) ; Ladd and Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine
Intoxication, 29 VA. L. REV. 749 (1943).
6. Ladd and Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine Intoxication,
29 VA. L. REV. 749 (1943).
7. For a discussion of the Harger Drunkometer see Harger, Lamb, and Hulpieu,
A Rapid Chemical Test for Intoxication Employing Breath, 110 A. M. A. J. 779 (1938).
For a criticism of the Drunkometer, see Haggard, Greenberg, Miller, and Carroll, The
Alcohol of the Lung Air as an Index of Alcohol in the Blood, 26 J.. LAB. & CLIN. MED.
1527 (1938).
8. Leonard, Tests for Intoxication, 38 J. CRm. L. & CRInINOLOGY 533 (1948).
9. See Note, To What Extent Does the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Protect
an Accused from Physical Disclosures? 1 VAND. L. REv. 243 (1948).
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privilege is a personal one and is waived when the test is voluntarily taken. 10
But when the defendant has been forced to submit to the test against his will,
some courts have held such compulsion to be a violation of the privilege."
This view, however, does not seem to be consistent with holdings in other
cases that the privilege applies only to oral testimony on the part of the
accused. 12. Another problem involved is the possibility that a compulsory test
may be deemed an unlawful search and seizure.' 3 The results of such a test
may nevertheless be admissible in evidence in jurisdictions which hold illegally
obtained evidence admissible.14 It has been recommended that consent to
take the test be obtained in order to avert these problems.16
The Harger Drunkometer, like the various forms of "lie-detector,"
would meet a definite social need if recognized as having probative value.
Testimony interpreting the results of lie-detector tests has been excluded,
however, because of the general rule as to scientific evidence.'" The Michigan
court was undoubtedly correct in the instant case in refusing to allow testi-
mony founded on the Drunkometer test in the absence of a showing of its
general scientific acceptance. If and when such machines as the Drunkometer
and lie-detector are recognized, they will be valuable to juries in determining
the facts of a case and should be used wherever possible.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-REQUIREMENT THAT FEDERAL QUESTION
APPEAR ON FACE OF COMPLAINT-APPLICATION TO
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION
Plaintiff was engaged in the business of selling jewelry at retail, his
principal method of business being sales by public auction at night. De-
fendants, city commissioners of Hollywood, Florida, passed an ordinance
declaring the holding of such auction sales between 6 PM and 8 AM a
misdemeanor. Plaintiff, threatened with prosecution under the ordinance,
sought by proceedings under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act ' to have
10. Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547, 18 So. 2d 752 (1944) ; Spitler v. State, 221 Ind.
107, 46 N. E. 2d 591 (1943) ; State v. Small, 233 Iowa 1280, 11 N. W. 2d 377 (1943).
11. Booker V. Cincinnati, 5 Ohio Ops. 433, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 286, 1 Ohio Supp. 152
(1936); Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. Rep. 593, 146 S. W. 2d 381 (1940); accord,
People v. Dennis, 131 Misc. 62, 226 N. Y. Supp. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
12. Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 31 Sup. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021 (1910); Ridgell
v. United States, 54 A. 2d 679 (D. C. Mun. App. 1947) ; State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160
P. 2d 283, 164 A. L. R. 952 (1945) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (3d ed. 1940). But see
collection of cases in 8 id. § 2265 n.2.
13. See United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. Cal. 1949) (use of stomach
pump held to be unreasonable search).
14. See Note, 150 A. L. R. 566 (1944).
15. Leonard, Tests for Intoxication, 38 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 533 (1948).
16. People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503, 139 A. L. R. 1171 (1942); People
v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 913 (County Ct. 1938), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 204, 18
N. E. 2d 31, 119 A. L. R. 1198 (1938). See discussion of lie-detector tests in INnAu, LIE
DETEcTOR AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (2d ed. 1948).
1. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1948).
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the ordinance declared unconstitutional and to enjoin proceedings against
him by defendants. By appropriate motion, defendants raised the question
of the jurisdiction of the court. Held, the federal district court has jurisdiction
without reference to diversity of citizenship; a federal constitutional question
is involved. Zaconick v. City of Hollywood, 85 F. Supp. 52 (S. D. Fla. 1949).
Federal district courts by statute are given jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, where
the proper jurisdictional amount is involved. 2 The rule is well established that
the existence of a federal question must appear from the plaintiff's statement
of his own case, upon the face of the complaint, in order to warrant federal
jurisdiction. 3 Neither the defendant's answer, 4 nor an anticipatory reply
asserted in the plaintiff's complaint, 5 nor a petition for removal 6 can serve
as the basis for federal jurisdiction.
Although the court in the instant case disposes of the question of juris-
diction without discussion,7 it may well be important, in view of the general
rule stated above, to determine who is the actual plaintiff in a declaratory
judgment action. A petition under the declaratory judgment act may often
state as a basis of action what normally would be a defense or a reply in a
conventional suit. In effect, the declaratory judgment procedure may reverse
the normal order of the parties--i.e., the nominal defendant may be the real
plaintiff, who is being forced by the nominal plaintiff to state his case. Whether
this nominal.plaintiff, the normal defendant, in a declaratory judgment suit
should be allowed federal jurisdiction when it is his complaint that states
the federal question may depend upon the view taken as to his legal status.
If he is merely allowed to force the other party, who has the real cause of
action, to state this cause of action in court, it would seem that he remains
the real defendant and that federal jurisdiction should be denied under the
established jurisdictional rule. If, however, the declaratory judgment plaintiff
is held in legal theory to have a true cause of action, then federal jurisdiction
should, it seems, be granted upon the showing of a federal question in his
complaint.8
2. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1338 (1948).
3. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 14 Sup. Ct. 654, 38 L. Ed.
511 (1894) ; Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586, 9 Sup. Ct. 173, 32 L. Ed. 543 (1888).
4. See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U. S. 22, 25, 33 Sup. Ct. 410, 57 L.
Ed. 716 (1913).
5. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 29 Sup. Ct. 42, 53 L. Ed. 126 (1908);
Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 313, 26 Sup. Ct. 652, 50 L. Ed. 1046 (1905).
6. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 14 Sup. Ct. 654, 38 L. Ed.
511 (1894) ; see Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 113, 57 Sup. Ct. 96, 81 L. Ed.
70 (1936).
7. The district judge dismisses the question of federal jurisdiction in a brief paragraph,
holding that "it is obvious that the suit is one which arises under the Federal Constitution
.... A substantial and material Federal constitutional question is raised by the plaintiffs
and the jurisdictional amount is involved." 85 F. Supp. at 54-55. No authority is cited,
however, in support of this holding.
8. This problem of the reversal of the parties by the declaratory judgment act is dis-
cussed in Developments in the Law---Declaratory Judgments. 62 HARv. L. REv. 787 (1949).
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That the courts have inquired into the question as to who is the real
plaintiff in a declaratory judgment suit is shown by cases concerning a shifting
burden of proof, particularly by insurance cases where a declaration of non-
liability is sought.9 Normally the insured would have the burden, since, as
plaintiff, he must prove his claim. Some cases have held that when the in-
surance company sues as plaintiff for a declaration of non-liability, the burden
remains on the insured.10 By analogy, this inquiry into the true status of
the parties might well be extended into jurisdictional matters.
The theory of declaratory judgment acts, however, has been stated to
be that the nominal plaintiff, the real defendant, does have a "cause of
action." " The cases seem to uphold this theory of the text authorities,
although neither cases nor texts discuss squarely the problem involved in
the instant case.' 2 Most cases allow jurisdiction without discussing the matter
at all. 13
Here it is suggested, after the need for congressional clarification is pointed out, that the
preferable rule might be "that a declaratory action seeking to test a defense is triabie in the
federal courts provided this defense would normally arise in answer to a complaint which
itself would properly raise a federal question." Such a rule would achieve substantial con-
formity with principles applicable to conventional suits, and would make jurisdiction depend
on the nature of the coercive action anticipated by the declaratory judgment suit.
9. Burden on declaratory plaintiff: Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Fancher, 30 F. Supp.
264 (W. D. Mo. 1939); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Drumheller, 25 F. Supp. 606 (W. D. Mo.
1938). Burden on insured: State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Smith, 48 F. Supp. 570
(W. D. Mo. 1942); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Greenough, 88 N. H. 391, 190 Atl. 129, 109'
A. L. R. 1096 (1937).
10. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Smith, 48 F. Supp. 570 (W. D. Mo.
1942) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Greenough, 88 N. H. 391, 190 Ati. 12), 109 A. L. R. 1096
(1937). See concurring opinion of Sanborn, J., in Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, lZ
F. 2d 234, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1940). The better view may be that the declaratory judgment
plaintiff should assume the burden, since he is given substantial procedural advantages.
See ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 164 (1940); Developnents in the Law-
Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARv. L. REv. 787, 836 (1949); Note, 1941 Wis. L. REv. 513.
The important thing, however, is that the courts have considered the problem of the reversal
of the parties by the declaratory judgment act.
11. See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 16-24 (1941); ANDERSON, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS §§ 1, 2, 30 (1940) ; Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 21
VA. L. Rzv. 35, 42-43 (1934). Borchard points out that the defeat and denial of any
unfounded claim which disturbs or renders insecure a person's rights, whether of status
or property, is as much an interest capable of and in need of judicial protection as the
assertion of a valid claim; for example, a debtor has as much interest in denying an un-
founded claim of his creditor as the creditor has in asserting a claim upon the debtor.
Declaratory judgments, it is pointed out, are merely procedural extensions of judgments of
equity courts, which for centuries have been rendering decisions determining the rights of
the parties when there could be no execution of judgment.
12. See Regents of N. M. College v. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 158 F. 2d 900,
(10th Cir. 1947), where a declaratory action to establish a federal statute as a defense to
a prospective suit on a contract was held to present a federal question; the court did not
consider the fact that in a coercive action on the contract the complaint probably would
not have shown a federal question. See also Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co. v. Katzinger Co.,
123 F. 2d 518 (7th Cir. 1941); Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F. 2d
852 (7th Cir. 1937). But cf. International Harvest Hat Co. v. Caradine Hat Co., 17 F.
Supp. 79 (E. D. Mo. 1935). It should be noticed that in patent suits, where the plaintiff
seeks a declaration of non-infringement, it is the patentee, the defendant, who truly has
the federally protected right; whereas in the instant case, it is the plaintiff who asserts the
federally protected right.
13. E.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Conway, 115 F. 2d 746 (9th Cir. 1940); Publix
Cleaners v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board, 32 F. Supp. 31 (S. D. Fla. 1940);
Montejano v. Rayner, 33 F. Supp. 435 (D. Idaho 1939).
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It is interesting to note that there could have been no federal jurisdiction
by removal if the City of Hollywood as plaintiff had first brought this action
as a prosecution under the ordinance, as it normally would have done had
Zaconick actually violated the law.14 The city's petition would not show a
federal question on its face, and removal jurisdiction may not be obtained
-where the federal question is shown for the first time in the petition for
removal. 15 The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, however, was not intended
to extend or enlarge jurisdiction in any way.1 6 Seemingly there is a con-
tradiction between the allowance of original federal jurisdiction in the instant
case and the intent of the Act not to enlarge jurisdiction. The plaintiff in the
instant case by virtue of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is allowed
original federal jurisdiction which he would not have had otherwise, and
-which is, without the declaratory judgment act, positively denied by the
jurisdictional rule.
It is significant that the award of jurisdiction in most declaratory judg-
nent cases has been given without inquiry into the true nature of the action.
Perhaps the jurisdictional rule is satisfied by a statement of the federal
question by either party in a declaratory judgment suit; or perhaps the rule
in its strict sense is not intended to apply to declaratory judgment actions.'
7
In either event, the problem is deserving of attention and should be clarified
by the courts.
INCOME TAXES-DEDUCTION OF BUSINESS EXPENSES-DEDUCTIBILITY
OF PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF PRICE REGULATIONS
Petitioner, a converter of textiles, inadvertently violated ceiling price
regulations under the Emergency Price Control Act of 19421 by making
excessive charges for shrinkages. Upon discovering the violations petitioner
voluntarily disclosed them to the Office of Price Administration. Refund of
the overcharges to its customers being impossible, petitioner paid the amount
of the excessive charges to the United States in settlement of all claims
14. Cf. Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 14 Sup. Ct. 654, 38 L.
Ed. 511 (1894) (defendant bank tried to raise the federal consitutional question in its
petition for removal).
15. Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank, supra note 14.
16. The statute itself states that a remedy is created by the declaratory judgment pro-
cedure in cases "of actual controversy within its jurisdiction." 28 U. S. C. § 2201 (1948).
See, e.g., Ambassade Realty Corp. v. Winkler, 83 F. Supp. 227, 228 (D. Mass. 1949)
("The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act confers no additional jurisdiction on the district
courts but applies only to controversies otherwise within the jurisdiction of such courts").
See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 232-37 (1941); ANDERSON, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS § 19 (1940).
17. The jurisdictional rule, it should be remembered, was firmly established as early
as 1894 in Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 14 Sup. Ct. 654, 38 L. Ed.
511, while the federal declaratory judgment act was not enacted until 1934.
1. 56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix §§ 901 et seq. (1944).
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against it by the Government. It now seeks to deduct the sum thus paid front
its gross income as a business expense.2 From disallowance of the deduction
by the Tax Court 3 petitioner appeals. Held, reversed. The sum paid to the
Government was not penal in nature, but even if it were a penalty it would
be deductible since the deduction would violate no policy underlying the Price
Control Act. Jerry Rossinan Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 175 F. 2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
It is the alternative holding which makes the instant case particularly
significant. In allowing the deduction the case not only differs from previous
decisions involving payments to the OPA,4 but insofar as it recognizes the
deductibility of penalties it represents a departure from a rule heretofore
followed almost without exception. Although the revenue acts do not so
provide, prior to the instant case the general rule was that statutory penalties
could not be deducted as business expenses. 5 Despite frequent criticism 5
the courts applied this rule automatically. If a payment to the state or Federal
Government could be characterized as penal, it was held non-deductible re-
gardless of whether it resulted from a criminal prosecution or civil action by
the government7 The intentions and good faith of the violator were im-
2. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (a). This section permits as deductions, "All the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business....
3. 10 T. C. 468 (1948).
4. E.g., Scioto Provision Co., 9 T. C. 439 (1947) (penalties paid although infraction
of regulations denied); Garibaldi & Cuneo, 9 T. C. 446 (1947) (violations could have
been avoided by use of care). In I. T. 3627, 1943 CuMI. BULL. 111 and I. T. 3630, 1943
Cum. BULL. 113, the Treasury Department recognized the deductibility of payments to
consumers for violations of price regulations but denied deductions where, as in the in-
stant case, the purchaser from taxpayer was not the ultimate consumer and had no right
of action but taxpayer made payments to the Government to settle its claims. The latter
payments were deemed to be penalties. See 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §
25.36 (Supp. 1949) ; Gelfand, Payments to OPA, 27 TAXES 961 (1949).
5. E.g., Comm'r v. Portland Cement Co., 148 F. 2d 276 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. delied,
326 U. S. 728 (1945) (penalties for violation of state anti-trust laws); Helvering v.
Superior Wines & Liquors, Inc., 134 F. 2d 373 (8th Cir. 1943) (fine for negligence in
failing to keep records required by federal statute) ; United States v. Jaffray, 97 F. 2d
488 (8th Cir. 1938), aff'd sub nor. United States v. Bertelsen, 306 U. S. 276, 59 Sup, Ct.
541, 83 L. Ed. 647 (1939) (understatement of tax liability) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v.
Comm'r, 47 F. 2d 990 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 618 (1931) (violation of
safety laws) ; Great Northern Ry. v. Comm'r, 40 F. 2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U. S. 855 (1930) (same). Among the many cases in the Tax Court and Board of Tax
Appeals denying deductibility of penalties, see Universal Atlas Co., 9 T. C. 971 (1947),
affd per curiam, 171 F. 2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948); Kossar & Co., 16 B. T. A. 952 (1929) ;
Columbus Bread Co., 4 B. T. A. 1126 (1926); Sarah Backer, 1 B. T. A. 214 (1924).
But cf. Huff, Andrews & Thomas, 1 B. T. A. 542 (1925).
6. See Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F. 2d 178, 180 (2d Cir. 1931),
17 VA. L. REv. 831; Notes, 31 COL. L. REV. 1344 (1931), 56 HARy. L. REV. 1142 (1943),
54 HARv. L. REv. 852 (1941) ; 57 HARe. L. REV. 109 (1943) ; 54 HARV. L. REV. 698 (1941).
7. E.g., Comm'r v. Portland Cement Co., 148 F. 2d 276 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U. S. 728 (1945) (civil action for damages) ; United States v. Jaffray, 97 F. 2d 488,
494 (8th Cir. 1938), aff'd sub non. United States v. Bertelsen, 306 U. S. 276, 59 Sup. Ct.
541, 83 L. Ed. 647 (1939) (negligence penalty in civil action) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v.
Comm'r, 47 F. 2d 990 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 618 (1931) (civil liability);
Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931) (fines in criminal
action) ; Columbus Bread Co., 4 B. T. A. 1126 (1926) (criminal action).
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material,8 and no consideration was given to the purposes for which the
statute infringed was enacted or to whether the prohibited conduct was
inalum in se or merely 7nahm prohibitunt.9
In many cases the social desirability of denying the deduction may be
a controlling factor, particularly where the deduction would thwart some
purpose of the underlying statute or where the violation was intentional,
fraudulent or morally reprehensible. 10 However, since innocent violations
of complex statutory regulations are almost inevitable in the conduct of
business," the rule denying deductibility to penalties seems too broad to fit
all cases. Several reasons have been given in support of the rule, but none
of them is applicable to every situation. For example, many courts have dis-
allowed the deduction on the grounds that violation of the law is no part
of a taxpayer's business and therefore penal exactions cannot be "ordinary"
or "necessary" expenses within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.12
While many penalties probably are not "ordinary" or "necessary" because
-not of everyday occurrence in business, 13 nevertheless whether a penal ex-
pense is deductible or not should be determined after consideration of the
particular penalty involved rather than by an automatic rule applicable to
all penalties.14 It is usually held that expenses incurred in settling claims for
tort liability to private persons may be deducted if properly incident to busi-
8. Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, Inc., 134 F. 2d 373 (8th Cir. 1943) (tax-
payer alleged ignorance of rules and procedure) ; see Burroughs Building Material Co. v.
Comm'r, 47 F. 2d 178, 180 (2d Cir. 1931) (deductions not allowable regardless of lack
of moral turpitude). In many cases the actual guilt of the taxpayer has not even been deter-
mined, the taxpayer choosing often to pay the penalty rather than litigate with the govern-
ment. E.g., Comm'r v. Portland Cement Co., 148 F. 2d 276 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U. S. 728 (1945) ; Scioto Provision Co., 9 T. C. 439 (1947).
9. Cases cited notes 7 and 8 supra; 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCO-mE TAXATION 384 n.
5 (1942). But see United States v. Jaffray, 97 F. 2d 488, 493 (8th Cir. 1938) (penalty
for mere negligence might be deductible under some circumstances); Sarah Backer, 1
B. T. A. 214, 216 (1924) (possible distinction between types of conduct).
10. See Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F. 2d 178, 180 (2d Cir. 1931);
Notes, 31 COL. L. REv. 1344 (1931), 54 HARV. L. REv. 852 (1941) ; 43 HARV. L. REV. 661
(1930).
11. See Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F. 2d 178, 180 (2d Cir. 1931);
Gelfand, Payments to OPA, 27 TAXES 961 (1949); Notes, 31 COL. L. REV. 1344, 1346
(1931), 54 HARV. L. REv. 852, 854 (1941).
12. E.g., Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, Inc., 134 F. 2d 373, 376 (8th Cir.
1943) ; United States v. Jaff ray, 97 F. 2d 488, 493 (8th Cir. 1938), aff'd sub nor. United
States v. Bertelsen, 306 U. S. 276, 59 Sup. Ct. 541, 83 L. Ed. 647 (1939) ; Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ry. v. Comm'r, 47 F. 2d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 618 (1931) ;
see National Outdoor Adv. Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F. 2d 878, 881 (2d Cir. 1937) ("the
law will not recognize the necessity of engaging in illegal courses in the conduct of a
business").
13. 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 25.35 (1942). In order to be an
ordinary" or "necessary" expense an expenditure must be "proximately related" to the
business, must be natural and normal in the conduct or defense of the business, and must
not be personal to the taxpayer. See generally Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 54
Sup. Ct. 8, 78 L. Ed. 212 (1933) ; Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145, 48 Sup. Ct.
219, 72 L. Ed. 505 (1928) ; Note, 54 HARV. L. REv. 852 (1941).
14. As a general rule whether an expenditure meets the requirements for the deduction
is a question of fact to be determined from ,all the circumstances of each case, and it is




ness even though such payments result from the taxpayer's wrongful actions
and are often punitive.15 It is difficult to see why the deduction should be
allowed in proper instances in the tort cases and yet be denied as a matter
of law when the payment is to the government rather than to a private
claimant. 16
It would seem that in all cases the nature of the taxpayer's conduct, the
purposes of the statute or regulation involved, and the incidence of the ex-
pense to the business should be considered. While this rule would not be as.
easy to apply as the broad general rule, it would lead to less arbitrary results.
Such a rule has been adopted in considering the deductibility of legal ex-
penses incurred in the defense of criminal or penal actions. 17 Formerly such
expenses were deductible where the taxpayer was acquitted if they were
reasonably connected with his business,'5 but they were never deductible
when the taxpayer was found guilty.19 The reasons given for non-deductibility
were the same as those given in the penalty cases. However, in Commissioner
v. Heininger,20 the Supreme Court allowed deduction of legal expenses in-
curred in the unsuccessful defense of a fraud order issued by the Postmaster
General. The deduction was held to violate no policy of the statute authorizing
fraud orders, and the expenses were deemed appropriate and helpful to the
business.
In the principal case the court followed the approach of the Supreme
Court in the Heininger case, holding that the general rule as to penalties
is a mere "judicial gloss" which is not to be applied to all cases. This result
seems sound and the holding will probably be followed when there are inno-
15. E.g., Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F. 2d 358 (7th Cir. 1935) (amount of judgment
deductible although taxpayer guilty of fraud). See 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME '1 AXATION
§ 25.37 (1942) ; Note, 31 COL. L. REv. 1344, 1347 (1931). For a collection of cases see
Note, 104 A. L. R. 680, 686 (1936).
16. See Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F. 2d 178, 180 (2d Cir. 1931).
One reason frequently assigned for disallowing the deduction in penalty cases while allowing
it in tort cases is that the punishment for violation of a statute is prescribed by the legisla-
ture; to allow the deduction would be to mitigate the punishment by reducing the fine or
penalty. E.g., Comm'r v. Portland Cement Co., 148 F. 2d 276 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U. S. 728 (1945) ; Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F. 2d 358 (7th Cir. 1935) ; Great North-
ern Ry. v. Comm'r, 40 F. 2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 855 (1930).
This "public policy" argument has been criticized on the grounds that (1) Congress, not
the courts, should decide whether the deduction violates public policy; (2) denial of the
deduction allows additional punishment to be imposed upon the taxpayer through the
revenue laws; (3) denial of the deduction is inconsistent with the taxation of illegal
income; and (4) disallowance has the effect of taxing gross rather than net income. See
Notes, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1142 (1943), 54 HARV. L. REV. 852 (1941); 57 HARv. L. REv.
109 (1943) ; 54 HAR. L. REv. 698 (1941).
17. Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467, 64 Sup. Ct. 249, 88 L. Ed. 171 (1943).
18. For collections of cases, see Notes, 104 A. L. R. 680, 683 (1936), 88 L. Ed. 197
(1944) ; 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.36 (1942).
19. National Outdoor Adv. Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F. 2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Gould
Paper Co. v. Comm'r, 72 F. 2d 698 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Burroughs Building MaterialPCo. v.
Comm'r, 47 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931). Contra: Foss v. Comm'r, 75 F. 2d 326 (1st Cir.
1935). See note 18 supra.
20. 320 U. S. 467, 64 Sup. Ct. 249, 88 L. Ed. 171 (1943).
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cent violations of statutes and regulations other than those on price control.21
The approach taken in the instant case is in accord with that being adopted
in other fields of income taxation. For example, in cases involving the
validity for tax purposes of family partnerships, a former rule of thumb
has been abandoned in favor of a more comprehensive rule which takes into
consideration the intentions of the parties and the circumstances of each case.
22
INSURANCE-"COMPREHENSIVE" COVERAGE OF AUTOMOBILE POLICY
-- "THEFT" HELD NOT TO INCLUDE "UNAUTHORIZED USE"
Defendant insurer issued to plaintiff a policy of automobile insurance
with a comprehensive clause protecting against loss or damage caused by
"theft." Plaintiff's husband, who stood in the position of the insured, asked
one Campbell to park the automobile. Campbell instead went for an unauthor-
ized ride to another city, during which a collision occurred. Plaintiff sought
to recover on the theft insurance policy. The referee found that Campbell had
intended to return the automobile at the end of his ride, but concluded that
"unauthorized use" was a "theft" within the meaning of the policy. Held,
exceptions to the report of referee sustained. The absence of animals furandi
precludes recovery, since as used in the policy, theft is synonymous with com-
ihon law larceny. Wheeler v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 65 A. 2d 10 (Me. 1949)
The instant holding is in accord with the holdings in the great majority
of the cases to the effect that there must be present a criminal intent .perma
nently to deprive the owner of the insured automobile.' This intent is neces-
sary for a taking to constitute common law larceny, 2 and "theft" is generally
construed as synonymous with larceny.3 A few jurisdictions hold that their
special statutes have eliminated the necessity for such intent in automobile
21. Gelfand, Payments to OPA, 27 TAXES 961 (1949). The author of this article
suggests, for example, that penalties for violations of child-labor laws or postal regulations
might well be deductible under the theory of the principal case, where the violations are
unintentional and cannot be avoided with reasonable care.
22. Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733, 69 Sup. Ct. 1210 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REv.
136.
1. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp. v. Ratterman, 262 Ky. 350, 90 S. W. 2d 679
(1936); Kovero v. Hudson Ins. Co., 192 Minn. 10, 255 N. W. 93 (1934); Van Vechten
v. American Eagle Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432 (1925); Hanes Funeral
Home v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 216 N. C. 562, 5 S. E. 2d 820 (1939); La Motte v. Retail
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 41, 233 N. W. 566 (1930). See generally 5 APPLEmAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 3209-17 (1941); 5 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW §§ 1176, 1176a (1929).
2. State v. Coombs, 55 Me. 477, 92 Am. Dec. 610 (1867) ; MILLER, CRIMIINAL LAW
§ 109 (1934); BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 662 (Baldwin's ed. 1946).
3. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wimbish, 12 Ga. App. 712, 78 S. E. 265, 266 (1913);
Home Ins. Co. v. Mathis, 109 Ind. App. 25, 32 N. E. 2d 108 (1941); 41 WORDS AND
PHRASES 482 (Perm. ed. 1940).
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cases, and have allowed recovery on theft insurance policies in cases like the
principal case.
4
The conflict in the various interpretations of the meaning of the word
"theft" as found in automobile insurance policies arises from the "joyriding"
or "unauthorized use" statutes enacted in many states.5 That "theft" includes
a mere unauthorized use would seem more probable in a state having a statute
which makes such taking punishable as larceny.6 In Globe & Rutgers Fire
Insurance Co. v. Hou.Se 7 the Tennessee court held that a felonious taking
was required to constitute "theft," and that by statute the unauthorized taking
or use of an automobile (regardless of animus furandi) was made a felony.
But the court indicated that unauthorized use by a bailee would not constitute
a "theft" under the terms of the policy, such bailee being guilty only of a
misdemeanor. The result is that "theft" remains synonymous with larceny.8
Yet one jurisdiction has allowed recovery on a theft policy, holding that al-
though the unauthorized taking was not larceny, it was embraced within the
term "theft" as in common thought and speech. 9
In contrast to the rigorous majority requirement of a larcenous intent
is the fluid state of the authorities on the analogous question of whether a
"theft" comprehends the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses, 0
or that of misappropriation by a bailee. 11 At common law, "larceny by deceit"
-that is, where property is acquired by fraud with a larcenous intent-is as
much a theft as a stealthful taking,' 2 though more difficult to establish. A
criminal intent permanently to deprive the owner may be presumed in some
instances, 13 but generally the burden of proof is upon the one charging lar-
4. Baker v. Continental Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 26, 122 P. 2d 710 (1942); Globe &
Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. House, 163 Tenn. 585, 45 S. W. 2d 55 (1932).
5. Some statutes make the unauthorized taking of an automobile punishable as
larceny: Ky. STAT. ANN. § 2739g-58 (Carroll, 1936); N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1293-a;
TENN. CODE: ANN. § 10948 (Williams, 1934). Others declare such taking a misde-
meanor: ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 339 (1940) ; LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5289.1 (Dart, 1939).
Some merely state the penalty for conviction of unauthorized taking or use: IND. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10-3010, 10-3012 (Burns, 1933); Wis. STAT. § 343:18 (1947).
6. See note 4 supra. But cf. Hanes Funeral Home v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 216
N. C. 562, 5 S. E. 2d 820 (1939).
7. 163 Tenn. 585, 45 S. W. 2d 55 (1932).
8. In the principal case the court considered ME. REv. ST. C. 19, § 120, c. 118,
§ 25 (1944), and said that "unauthorized use" constitutdd only a misdemeanor, requiring
no animus furandi, and was not included as "theft" in the policy.
9. Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 117 F. 2d 774 (D. C. Cir.
1941), 41 COL. L. REV. 1113. But cf. DeLong v. Massachusetts Ins. Co., 142 Misc. 654,
256 N. Y. Supp. 300 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd, 238 App. Div. 760, 262 N. Y. Supp. 165
(4th Dep't 1933).
10. James v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 75 Colo. 209, 225 Pac. 213 (1924); Nugent v.
Union Auto Ins. Co., 140 Ore. 61, 13 P. 2d 343 (1932); 16 IOWA L. REv. 281 (1931);
13 MINN. L. REv. 153 (1929); 17 ORE. L. REV. 345 (1938).
11. Granger v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 108 Cal. App. 290, 291 Pac. 698 (1930);
Allen v. Berkshire Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Vt. 471, 168 At. 698 (1933).
12. Champion v. Chicago Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 141 At. 749 (N. J. 1928) ; Home
Ins. Co. v. Paul, 128 Okla. 142, 261 Pac. 927 (1927); Simpson v. Palmetto Fire Ins.
Co., 145 S. C. 405, 143 S. E. 184 (1928); MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW § 112 (1934); 24
WORDS AND PHRASES 231 (Perm. ed. 1940).
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ceny.14 In either case, the ascertainment of the wrongdoer's intent still re-
mains a question of fact,15 and in close cases a verdict for the insured will be
affirmed. 16
As recognized in the principal case, the construction of contracts is
traditionally a function of the court.'1 It is well established that contracts of
insurance should be liberally construed in favor of the insured;18 yet the
meaning of "theft" is equally as well established. Insurance companies have
shown by their adherence to the word "theft" in their policies that they accept
the judicial interpretation of the word.19 Were it changed by the courts, there
would necessarily result a change in the language of policies or an increase in
theft insurance rates.
INSURANCE-FAILURE OF INSURER TO SETTLE CLAIM-NEGLIGENCE
OR BAD FAITH AS THE TEST FOR LIABILITY FOR EXCESS JUDGMENTS
The owner of a trucking business sued to recover damages from his
liability insurer for the insurer's failure to settle a claim against him. The
deferkdant had refused various offers to settle starting at $1,113, although
the insurance policy covered liability up to $6,000. Final judgment of $12,000
had been awarded the claimant in the accident case against the present plain-
tiff. The trial court gave judgment n.o.v. for the defendant insurer and the
intermediate appellate court affirmed. Held (5-2), judgment reversed and
cause remanded. The insurer is liable if it acted in bad faith (arbitrarily or
capriciously), but not for mere negligence, in refusing to settle the claim.
Hart v. Republic Mutual Ins. Co., 87 N. E. 2d 347 (Ohio 1949).
The courts are in disagreement as to the standard to set for liability of
13. "Indeed in the common practice of automobile thieves there is no intention of
depriving the owner of it permanently. The thief's intention as indicated by his usual
conduct is to use the car for a few hours or a few days and abandon it before the
peril of his incriminating possession of it leads to his undoing." Dawson, C. J., in
Baker v. Continental Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 26, 28, 122 P. 2d 710, 712 (1942); State v.
Deal, 64 N. C. 270 (1870). Also see Note, 152 A. L. R. 1100 (1944).
14. People v. Payne, 3 P. 2d 328 (Cal. App. 1931); State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37,
189 Pac. 84 (1920).
15. Standard Chevrolet Co. v. Federal Hardware & Implement Mutuals, 178 So.
642 (La. App. 1937) ; Laird v. Home Ins. Co., 177 So. 603 (La. App. 1937) ; Repp v.
American Farmers' Ins. Co., 179 Minn. 167, 228 N. W. 605 (1930); Rapaport v.
American Cent. Ins. Co., 137 Wash. 236, 242 Pac. 40 (1926).
16. Pask v. London Ins. Co., 211 Ill. App. 271 (1918); Weir v. Central Nat.
Ins. Co., 194 Iowa 446, 189 N. W. 794 (1922) - Miller v. Newark Fire' Ins. Co., 12 La.
App. 315, 125 So. 150 (1929); Mullany v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 29, 287 N. W.
118 (1939). For discussion on admissibility of evidence of previous criminal convictions
in civil theft insurance cases, see 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1671a (3d ed. 1940).
17. 9 WIOmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2556 (3d ed. 1940); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 616
(Rev. ed. 1936).
18. Baker v. Continental Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 26, 122 P. 2d 710 (1942); Globe &
Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. House, 163 Tenn. 585, 45 S. W. 2d 55 (1932).
19. 5 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1176 (1929).
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an insurer for its refusal to settle a claim against the insured.' And there is
similar disagreement as to other problems in the field.2 Some courts hold that
in handling claims the insurer is the agent of the insured; 3 others say it
is an independent contractor. 4 Some courts make a distinction between the
act of defending suits against the insured and the act of negotiating settle-
ments,5 while others hold the relationship is the same in the two acts.0
Although recovery has been sought for excess judgments on the basis of
contract,7 most courts hold that liability is on a tort basis.8
There is little disagreement with the position that an insurer is liable
for negligence in conducting the defense of a suit against the insured.9 But
as to liability for refusing to settle, it has been said that the courts are divided
into three groups: 10 (1) those which hold that the insurer is not liable for
any amount above the maximum set by the policy, regardless of its conduct
in refusing to settle;11 (2) those which allow recovery only where there is
1. For a discussion of cases, see Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indemnity
Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N. E. 2d 896 (1st Dist. 1945) ; Notes, 34 A. L. R. 730 (1925),
37 A. L. R. 1484 (1925), 43 A. L. R. 326 (1926), 71 A. L. R. 1467, 1485 (1931), 131
A. L. R. 1499 (1941).
2. "Since the whole scheme of liability insurance was predicated on the legal concept
of one's responsibility for the harmful consequences of his careless or wrongful acts or of
those of his servants, it was also inevitable that these broader considerations of policy,
of social expediencies, and of legal implications should come before the courts." McNeely,
The Genealogy of Liability Insurance Law, 7 U. OF PiTT. L. Rxv. 169, 196 (1941). See
9 MD. L. REV. 349, 356 (1948) (insurer as a public servant).
3. E.g., Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 Atl.
708, 37 A. L. R. 1477 (1924). Where the principal has full knowledge and gives his consent,
the other party may be an agent although their personal interests are antagonistic. 1
MECHEm, AGENCY § 177 (2d ed. 1914). But see 13 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 105, 108 (1945).
4. E.g., Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573 (1st Cir.
1917); Foremost Dairies v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196 S. E. 279, 283
(1938). For discussion of the kinds of relationships created by an insurance contract, see
Note, 8 MINN. L. REV. 151 (1924); 34 COL. L. REV. 511, 512 (1934); 31 ILL. L. Rrv.
116 (1936) ; 1 Mo. L. REV. 198 (1936) ; 15 N. C. L. REV. 422 (1937).
5. E.g., Auto Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938). "Al-
though the insurer may be an agent in defense of the suit, in the matter of settlement the
relationship between the parties is contractual and not one of agency." 77 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 289 (1928).
6. In cases where the plaintiff has alleged negligence in both defending and refusing
to settle, the courts are not always clear as to whether relief was granted on the basis of
negligence in defending or in refusing to settle or both. E.g., Ballard v. Ocean Accident &
Guaranty Co., 86 F. 2d 449 (7th Cir. 1936) ; Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident Assur.
Corp., 79 N. H. 186, 106 Atl. 604 (1919).
7. Belt Automobile Idemnity Ass'n v. Ensley Transfer & Supply Co., 211 Ala. 84, 99
So. 787 (1924).
8. E.g., Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine Insurance Co., 240 Fed. 573 (1st
Cir. 1917) ; Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 N. Y. 235, 104 N. E. 622, 624, L. R. A.
1915A 629 (1914); Note, 48 MicHa. L. REV. 95 (1949); 24 MICH. L. REV. 173 (1926).
See Note, 131 A. L. R. 1499 (1941).
9. E.g., Auto Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938) ; Douglas
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 271, 127 Atl. 708, 37 A. L. R. 1477
(1924); 15 N. C. L. REV. 422 (1937).
10. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S. W. 2d 777, 779 (1932); 62
HARv. L. REV. 104, 105 (1948).
11. E.g., Belt Automobile Indemnity Ass'n v. Ensley Transfer & Supply Co., 211
Ala. 84, 99 So. 787 (1924) ; Auerbach v. Md. Casualty Co., 236 N. Y. 247, 140 N. E. 577,
28 A. L. R. 1294 (1923).
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bad faith;12 and (3) those which make negligence a basis for liability.'3
Commentators are in disagreement as to which is the majority rule.
14
This division, however, is more apparent than real. The courts holding
that there can be no recovery for the insurer's refusal to settle are uniform
in their opinions, and the courts holding to the negligence rule generally are
consistent in theirs; but courts following the bad-faith doctrine have set up
standards which range from just beyond the no-recovery rule to a point
overlapping with negligence. The result is that the standards form a con-
tinuum stretching from one extreme to the other.
The negligence standard is usually expressed as "that degree of care
and diligence which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the
management of his own business." 15 But there is no customary way of
expressing a standard for determining whether the insurer has acted in bad
faith. Indeed, there is no clear agreement as to what is meant by bad faith.
Each of the following expressions has been used in an attempt to define the con-
cept. The insurer must not be fraudulent or dishonest,16 but bad faith cannot
be based merely on impolitic conduct. 17 It takes something more than mere
mistake to constitute bad faith.' 8 The obligation is based upon principles of
fair dealing, and the insurer must give equal consideration to the interests of
the insured. 19 To act in good faith, the insurer must exercise reasonable
diligence in learning the facts and its decision must be based on those facts.
20
12. E.g., American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Nichols Co., 173 F. 2d 830 (10th Cir.
1949); Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 N. Y. 235, 104 N. E. 622, L. R. A. 1915A
629 (1914).
13. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573 (1st Cir. 1917);
Anderson v. Southern Surety Co., 107 Kan. 375, 191 Pac. 583, 21 A. L. R. 761 (1920).
14. Probably a majority of the courts follow the bad faith doctrine with its many
variations. Notes, 71 A. L. R. 1467, 1485 (1931), 131 A. L. R. 1499, 1501 (1941). But
see 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4712 (1942) : "It should be noted,
however, that this bad faith rule is tending to become the minority rule, being displaced
by the rule of negligence."
15. E.g., Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Co., 86 F. 2d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 1936);
Auto Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852, 859 (1938).
16. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F. 2d 616, 618 (8th Cir. 1934);
Noshey v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 68 F. 2d 808, 811 (6th Cir. 1934) ; Johnson v.
Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A. 2d 817, 820 (1938) ; Wisconsin Zinc Co. v.
Fidelity and Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N. W. 1081, 1086 (1916).
17. See Levin v. New England Casualty Co., 101 Misc. 402, 166 N. Y. Supp. 1055,
1057 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (concurring opinion), affd, 233 N. Y. 631, 135 N. E. 948 (1922).
18. Mendota Electric Co. v. N. Y. Indemnity Co., 175 Minn. 181, 221 N. W. 61, 62
(1928); Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269, 91 S. E. 946,
947 (1917) ; Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A. 2d 817, 820 (1938).
19. American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Nichols Co., 173 F. 2d 830, 832 (10th
Cir. 1949) ; Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F. 2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 316 U. S. 672 (1942) ; Amercian Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F. 2d
446, 448 (5th Cir. 1932); McCombs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,-231 Mo. App. 1206, 89
S. W. 2d 114, 122 (1935); Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 N. Y. 235, 104 N. E.
622, 624, L. R. A. 1915A 629 (1914) ; National Mutual Casualty Co. v. Britt, 200 P. 2d
407, 411 (Okla. 1948) ; Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A. 2d 817,
820 (1938). Contra: Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N. W.
1081, 1087 (1916).
20. A good faith decision not to settle must be preceded by "the exercise of that de-
gree of care and diligence which a man of ordinary care and prudence would exercise in
the investigation and adjustment of claims . . . ." Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co.,
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It has no right to abuse its power by acting recklessly and contumaciously in
refusing to settle; 2 1 and it must not act capriciously 22 on the ground there
was an element of chance that the insured might win the suit brought against
him by the claimant. 23 "It could not blindly and arbitrarily refuse to make
settlement." 2 4 It could refuse only "upon reasonable ground for the belief
that the amount required to effect a settlement is excessive." 25
Regardless of the rule followed, the courts generally hold that it is for
the jury to decide whether there is liability,2 6 unless the evidence is so in-
sufficient that the court may decide it as a "matter of law." 27 The admin-
istrative problem is a serious one.28 If the negligence rule is followed, the
jury is likely to find against the insurer because hindsight indicates that it
erred in refusing to settle. Yet the negligence rule offers a standard which is
easier to present to a jury.29 The bad faith rule would allow the insurer more
freedom in deciding whether or not to settle, but the courts have not clearly
defined a standard by which to explain to a jury what is meant by "bad faith."
In the instant case the court said that a refusal to settle must not be
based on an arbitrary or capricious belief that the insured would not be held
liable, and that "conduct of the insurer must be based on circumstances that
furnish re'asonable justification therefor." 30 These statements do little to
clear up the problem of instructing the jury in the meaning of bad faith, but
they fit well into the pattern of allowing recovery for bad faith only-a bad
faith defined to be close to negligence in effect.
204 Wis. 1, 235 N. W. 413, 415 (1931). See National Mutual Casualty Co. v. Britt, 200
P. 2d 407, 412 (Okla. 1948).
21. Wisconsin Zinc. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N. W. 1081,
1087 (1916).
22. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F. 2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 316 U. S. 672 (1942).
23. McCombs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 213 Mo. App. 1206, 89 S. W. 2d 114, 122
(1935); National Mutual Casualty Co. v. Britt, 200 P. 2d 407, 412 (Okla. 1948).
24. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F. 2d 616, 618 (8th Cir. 1934).
25. Mendota Electric Co. v. N. Y. Indemnity Co., 175 Minn. 181, 221 N. W. 61 (1928).
In 15 MARQ. L. REv. 225, 226 (1931), it is suggested that proof of negligence is sufficient
to find bad faith.
26. E.g., Noshey v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 68 F. 2d 808, 811 (6th Cir. 1934)
Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 At!. 708, 710, 37
A. L. R. 1477, 1480 (1924); Note, 131 A. L. R. 1499, 1507 (1941).
27. E.g., Burnham v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 10 Wash. 2d 624, 117 P. 2d 644
(1941).
28. Appleman, Duty of Liability Inmurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L. J. 100,
111 (1938) (jury incompetent to decide).
29. 39 YALE L. J. 283, 285 (1929) (application of the negligence rule is at least as
satisfactory as the good faith test).
For a full discussion of the administrative problem see 25 TExAs L. Rav. 423 (1947).
30. 87 N. E. 2d at 349. The court also said that a jury might find bad faith because
the traffic injuries were serious and permanent; the insurer had no eyewitness to sustain
its claim of non-liability; the first offer of settlement was small; the insured's trucks were
seized while the litigation was in progress; and because the president of the insurer cor-
poration failed to keep an engagement with the insured to investigate the claim.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT FOR QUIET ENJOYMENT IN A
LEASE-BREACH WITHOUT EVICTION
Complainant lessee, while still in possession of leased premises, sought
damages for breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment upon a showing that
defective plumbing in upstairs apartments for which defendant lessor was
responsible caused water to seep into the leased premises and damage com-
plainant's merchandise. Held, defendant's demurrer was properly over-
ruled; eviction is not prerequisite to maintenance of a suit for breach of a
covenant for quiet enjoyment. Moe v. Sprankle, 221 S. W. 2d 712 (Tenn.
App. E. S. 1948).
A covenant for quiet enjoyment in a lease affords the tenant protection in
his quiet and beneficial possession of the premises against acts of the lessor,
those claiming through or under him, and persons lawfully claiming under a
title paramount to that of the lessor.1
Even though the tenant is deprived of beneficial possession, the great
weight of authority holds that no action for breach of the covenant will lie so
long as the tenant continues in actual possession.2 In all jurisdictions physical
expulsion constitutes an eviction and thus is a breach; this is true even though
the lessee is excluded from only a part of the demised premises, if the act indi-
cates intent to deprive the lessee permanently of the portion taken.3 Courts
also recognize as a breach of the covenant a constructive eviction which arises
when the lessor, one claiming through or under him, or one claiming lawfully
under a paramount title, engages in conduct which materially reduces the
lessee's beneficial possession of the leased premises and which is followed by
the tenant's vacating the whole premises.4 Most courts say that there can be
no constructive eviction without an actual surrender of possession. Where the
equities strongly favor the lessee, however, many of these courts allow recovery
1. Not included are the acts of strangers, even though they be tenants of other por-
tions of the same property. Evans v. Williams, 291 Ky. 484, 165 S. W. 2d 52 (1942) ;
Weinstein v. Barrasso, 139 Tenn. 593, 202 S. W. 920, L. R. A. 1918D 1174 (1918);
Stephens Mfg. Co. v. Buntin, 27 Tenn. App. 411, 181 S. W. 2d 634 (W. S. 1944).
2. Callahan v. Goldman, 216 Mass. 238, 103 N. E. 689 (1913) ; Levy v. Cohen, 27
N. Y. S. 2d 385 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1941); Hayes v. Ferguson, 83 Tenn. 1, 54 Am.
Rep. 398 (1885) ; Heywood v. Ogden Motor Car Co., 71 Utah 417, 266 Pac. 1040, 62
A. L. R. 1232 (1928) ; 2 REEvEs, REAL PROPERTY § 592 (1909) ; 1 TAYLOR, LANDLORD
AND TENANT § 304 (8th ed., Buswell, 1887) ; 3 THOMPsON, REAL PROPERTY § 1285 (Perm.
ed. 1940) ; 2 UNDERHILL, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 428 (1909).
3. E.g., Landon v. Hill, 136 Cal. App. 560, 29 P. 2d 281 (1934) ; Sherman v. Williams,
113 Mass. 481, 18 Am. Rep. 522 (1873) ; Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201 (1870) ; 3
THOMPSON, REAL PPOPERTY § 1285 (Perm. ed. 1940). In this type of case the tenant's
liability for rent ceases until he is restored to possession of the whole premises, the rent
for the portion retained being uncollectible because the landlord will not be permitted to
apportion his own wrong. Morris v. Kettle, 57 N. J. L. 218, 30 Atl. 879 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
4. Leiferman v. Osten, 167 IIl. 93, 47 N. E. 203, 39 L. R. A. 156 (1897) ; Keating v.
Springer, 146 Ill. 481, 34 N. E. 805, 22 L. R. A. 544, 37 Am. St. Rep. 175 (1893) ; Rome v.
Johnson, 274 Mass. 444, 174 N. E. 716 (1931) ; Callahan v. Goldman, 216 Mass. 238, 103
N. E. 689 (1913) : see Weinstein v. Barrasso, 139 Tenn. 593, 598, 202 S. W. 920, 922,
L. R. A. 1918D 1174 (1918).
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on almost fictitious constructive eviction, or insignificant partial actual
eviction, 5 or sidestep the question and decide the case on other grounds.6
The instant case makes the distinction that eviction is necessary where the
tenant seeks to deny his liability for rent, but not where he is suing for damages
not directly involving rent. This case and those few holding in accord with
it 7 say in essence that if the facts would warrant the tenant's giving up posses-
sion, he may use them as a basis for a suit for damages, or as a basis for
recoupment in a suit by the lessor for rent, even though they will not of them-
selves remove the liability for rent.
While it is doubted, due to well settled precedents on this point, that many
courts will adopt the view expressed in the instant case, it seems to be logically
sound. There seems to be no good reason for exempting from the scope of the
covenant acts of the lessor which the tenant would be warranted in treating as
a constructive eviction although he elects, for reasons of his own, to retain the
possession of the premises in their less beneficial state.
REAL PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION BY THIRD PARTY-
RUNNING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AGAINST
REMAINDERMAN BEFORE DEATH OF LIFE TENANT
In 1889 one Hopson deeded a tract of land to his daughter-in-law for
life, remainder to plaintiffs. The life tenant was dispossessed in 1897 by
the defendant, who claimed title by virtue of a mortgage sale, the validity of
5. McAlester v. Landers, 70 Cal. 79, 11 Pac. 505 (1886); Herpolsheimer v. Funke,
1 Neb. Unoff. 471, 95 N. W. 688 (1901) ; Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N. W.
255 '1926). "In some cases ... in which there is stated to be an eviction constituting a
breach of the covenant, it does not appear that the lessor's [lessee's ?] possession of the
premises, as distinct from his right to enjoyment, had been in any way affected ... " 1
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 141 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
6. Winchester v. O'Brien, 266 Mass. 33, 164 N. E. 807, 64 A. L. R. 895 (1929). Cases
allowing recovery on the covenant but not discussing vacation of the premises include the
following: Brown v. Holyoke Water-Power Co., 152 Mass. 463, 25 N. E. 966, 23 Am.
St. Rep. 844 (1890) ; York v. Steward, 21 Mont. 515, 55 Pac. 29, 43 L. R. A. 125 (1898);
Washington Chocolate Co. v. Kent, 28 Wash. 2d 448, 183 P. 2d 514 (1947).
7. The same distinction is made in Keating v. Springer, 146 Ill. 481, 34 N. E. 805,
22 L. R. A. 544, 37 Am. St. Rep. 175 (1893) ; see Metropole Const. Co. v. Hartigan, 83
N. J. L. 409, 85 AtI. 313, 314 (Sup. Ct. 1912) ; Meeker v. Spalsbury, 66 N. J. L. 60, 48
At. 1026, 1027 (Sup. Ct. 1901). Contra: Callahan v. Goldman, 216 Mass. 238, 103 N. E.
689 (1913). "While it has been said that the lessor's act must, for this purpose, amount to
an eviction, and that his wrongful entry on the premises without claiming title, or without
doing such acts as amount to an assertion of title, is insufficient, because constituting merely
a trespass not amounting to an eviction, the trend of the later authorities is apparently to
the effect that any intentional interference by the covenantor with the covenantee's enjoy-
ment and use of the premises constitutes a breach of the covenant, regardless of whether
it results in an eviction." 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 151 (3d ed., Jones, 1939). "Acts
on the part of the lessor which interfere with the lessee's possession or enjoyment con-
stitute a breach although the lessee does not surrender possession. . . ." BENNETT, LAND-
LORD AND TENANT 296 (1939). The instant case encroaches on the broad rule that there
is no breach without an eviction, announced in Hayes v. Ferguson, 83 Tenn. 1, 54 Am,
Rep. 398 (1885), but since that rule was largely dictum as applied to the facts of that




which the court deemed it unnecessary to decide. Defendant had held actual,
open, notorious and exclusive possession for 49 years immediately preceding
the commencement of this action. Plaintiffs had actual knowledge at all
times of the existence and character of defendant's possession. The life tenant
died in 1940 and the plaintiff-remaindermen brought this action to quiet
title in themselves in 1947. Defendant pleaded the Kentucky 15-year statute
of limitations.' Held, judgment for defendant affirmed. The statute of
limitations began to run against the life tenant at the time of the commence-
ment of the adverse possession. After 15 years the life estate was extin-
guished and the statute began to run against the remaindermen. Brittenum
v. Cunningham, 310 Ky. 131, 220 S. W. 2d 100 (1949).
Statutes of limitations do not begin to run against rights of action
until those rights become legally enforceable.2 "So, as against one who has
a remainder upon an estate for life, the statute does not ordinarily begin to
run in favor of a third person, who takes wrongful possession during the
life tenancy, until the termination of the estate for life." 3 The difficult
question is what constitutes a termination of the life estate? The court in the
principal case held that possession adverse to the life tenant for the statutory
period destroyed the life estate and thus accelerated the remaindermen's
right of possession. 4 However, according to the great weight of authority,
"no right to possession arises on the part of the remainderman until the
actual death of the original tenant for life, even though the remainder be
vested and though the statute has run against the original tenant for life." 5
Thus, in cases where the remainderman has sued for possession after the
life tenant has been barred, but prior to his death, courts have generally
held that the action would not lie.6 Cbnsistently with this view, where the
remainderman has sued for possession after the death of the life tenant,
courts have held that possession did not become adverse as to the remainder-
man until the actual death of the life tenant.7
1. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.010 (1943).
2. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1152 (3d ed., Jones, 1939);' 33 Ama. JUR., Life
Estates, Remainders and Reversions § 187 (1941).
3. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1152 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
4. 220 S. W. 2d at 103.
5. Kales, Adverse Possession Against Reversioners and Remaindernten, 14 ILL. L.
REV. 124, 127 (1920); 12 Miss. L. J. 258 (1939).
6. E.g., Gregg v. Tesson, 1 Black 150, 17 L. Ed. 74 (U. S. 1861); Higgins v.
Crosby, 40 I1. 260 (1866) ; Jacobs v. Rice, 33 IIl. 370 (1864) ; Baker v. Oakwood, 123
N. Y. 16 (1890); Thompson's Heirs v. Green, 4 Ohio St. 216 (1854); Moore v. Luce,
29 Pa. 260 (1857).
7. "[B]ut it is a well settled rule of law, that one claiming in reversion, though
he may, if he will, take notice of any disseisin done to the tenant of the particular
estate, is yet not obliged so to do, but may wait till his right of entry accrues, upon the
death of the tenant for life, and may then enter, how long soever the particular tenant
may have been disseised." Tilson v. Thompson, 27 Mass. 359, 362, 10 Pick. 45, 46
(1830); Blakeney v. DuBose, 167 Ala. 627, 52 So. 746 (1910); Jackson v. Claypool,
179 Ky. 662, 201 S. W. 2 (1918); Carter v. Moore, 183 Miss. 112, 183 So: 512 (1938);
Webster v. Pittsburg, C. & T. R. R., 78 Ohio St. 87, 84 N. E. 592, 15 L. R. A. (N. s.)
1154 (1908) ; Blodgett v. Davenport, 219 Wis. 596, 263 N. W. 629 (1935).
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It is pertinent to consider the nature of the estate which an adverse
possessor holds, under this general rule, after the statute of limitations has
run against the life tenant but prior to the life tenant's death. He cannot
acquire the estate of the life tenant, because the effect of the running of
the statute is to extinguish the title of him who is barred, and to create a
new and original title in the adverse possessor.8 It is generally said that he
acquires a fee simple title good as against everyone except the remainder-
man.9 But does this not result in so changing the relation between the
remainderman and the adverse possessor as to prejudice the remainderman's
rights? "For.instance, what would have been waste on the part of a life
tenant would not be waste when committed by the holder of a fee, the re-
mainderman being as to him merely one entitled to re-enter upon a future
contingency, or the holder of what is in appearance at least a possibility
of reverter." 3o
It is apparent that these difficulties do not arise under the view adopted
by the court in the principal case. Here too, the adverse possessor holds a
fee simple good as against everyone except the remainderman, but, unlike
the situation described above, the rights of the remainderman are not prej-
udiced thereby, for he can maintain an action to secure possession of the
land. By the running of the statute, the life estate is as completely extin-
guished as though the life tenant were dead." And if the remainderman
neglects to assert his right to possession for the statutory period after
the extinguishment of the life estate, the title is quieted in the adverse
possessor, thus accomplishing the ultimate purpose Qf all statutes of lim-
itations.
12
In the instant case, the plaintiffs had actual knowledge of all the attend-
ant circumstances of defendant's possession. It is submitted, however, that
plaintiffs' knowledge or lack of knowledge should have been immaterial to
the decision of this case.'
3
8. "Although the effect of the statute is to divest the title of the former owner,
and to vest title in the wrongful possessor, the statute does not, it appears, transfer
the former title, but the wrongful possessor acquires an entirely new title." 4 TiFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 1172 (3d ed., Jones, 1939); Kales, supra note 5, at 127.
9. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1173 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
10. Kales, supra note 5, at 127-28; Note, 4 ILL. L. REV. 429 (1910).
11. 220 S. W. 2d at 103.
12. "The great purpose [of statutes of limitations] is automatically to quiet all titles
which are openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof of meritorious titles, and
correct errors in conveyancing." Ballantine, Title By Adverse Possession, 32 HAI1V.
L. REv. 135 (1919).
13. The rule is generally established that mere ignorance of the existence of a
cause of action, or of facts which constitute a cause of action will not postpone the
operation of the statute of limitations. E.g., Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So.
147 (1940) (tort); Miller v. Industrial Commission, 106 Colo. 364, 105 P. 2d 404
(1940) (workmen's compensation) ; Kennedy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 135 Conn.
176, 62 A. 2d 771 (1948) (tort); Wilcox v. Sams, 213 Ky. 696, 281 S. W. 832 (1926)
(real property); Kitchen-Miller Co. v. Kern, 170 Tenn. 10, 91 S. W. 2d 291 (1936)
(real property) ; 34 Am. Jua., Limitation of Actions § 230 (1941); 54 C. J. S., Limita-
tion of Actions § 205 (1948).
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The theory of this case that the running of the statute of limitations
against the life tenant so effectively terminates the life estate as to immedi-
ately start the statute running against the remainderman is not unique; 14
but it is a departure from the lines of reasoning generally followed by the
courts heretofore. 15 As the view adopted by this court more effectively
serves the purposes of statutes of limitations and more adequately achieves
the desired policy considerations, it would appear to be more desirable than
the generally accepted doctrine which allows the statute to run only upon
the death of the life tenant.
REAL PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-MISTAKE IN
BOUNDARY LINES
Plaintiffs claimed a strip of land by adverse possession. Their prede-
cessors had inclosed this land with their own in the mistaken belief that it
was within their true boundary line. It was so held and used continuously
for 40 years. A temporary writ of injunction was issued to prevent the
defendants from tearing down the existing fence. Held, writ made permanent.
Occupying property under an honest mistake does not prevent the possession
from being adverse and ripening into title. Liberto v. Steel, 221 S. W. 2d
701 (Tenn. 1949).
The states are in conflict upon the state of mind required for adverse
possession. Some American jurisdictions hold that subjective intent to claim
regardless of title is essential and that possession under a mistaken belief as
to the true boundary line is not adverse.' The majority of jurisdictions,
however, hold that subjective intention is immaterial. 2 This latter view gives
full force to the doctrine of adverse possession 3 and eliminates the difficulty
of determining what the possessor would have intended had he known the
facts to be otherwise. Possession for a long period of time leads to a pre-
sumption of the existence of a legal right in land,4 and from a practical stand-
14. See Kibbe v. Ditto, 93 U. S. 674, 23 L. Ed. 1005 (1876); Castner v. Walrod,
83 Ill. 171, 25 Am. Rep. 369 (1876).
ID. Cases cited in notes 6 and 7 supra; Kale, supra note 5, at 127.
1. Evert v. Turner, 184 Iowa 1253, 169 N. W. 625 (1918) ; Wilson v. Pum Ze, 167
Kan. 31, 204 P. 2d 723 (1949); Preble v. Maine Cent. R. R., 85 Me. 260, 27 AtI. 149
(1893) ; Newton v. McKeel, 142 Ore. 674,21 P. 2d 206 (1933) ; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
1159 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
2. Guy v. Lancaster, 250 Ala. 287, 34 So. 2d 499 (1948) ; Pitts v. Pitts, 213 Ark. 379,
210 S. W. 2d 502 (1948) ; Vade v. Sickler, 118 Colo. 236, 195 P. 2d 390 (1948) ; French
v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680 (1831) ; Bridges v. Brackett, 54 S. E. 2d 642
(Ga. 1949) ; Scoville v. Burns, 306 Ky. 315, 207 S. W. 2d 756 (1948) ; Landers v. Thomp-
son, 356 Mo. 1169, 205 S. W. 2d 544 (1947); Hallowell v. Borchers, 150 Neb. 322, 34
N. W. 2d 404 (1948); Menzner v. Tracy, 247 Wis. 245, 19 N. W. 2d 257 (1945). See
Note, 97 A. L. R. 14, 58 (1935) ; 2 C. J. S., Adverse Possession § 84 (1936).
3. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REv. 135 (1918).
4. See note 15 infra; Hackett, Judicial Conflict-Mistake in Boundary Lines, 9
HARV. L. REv. 464, 469 (1896).
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point the mistaken belief of the possessor should be immaterial, allowing what
has factually happened to govern.
5
To depend heavily upon what the mental status of the possessor would
have been had he known the facts disregards the very purposes which the
doctrine of adverse possession was designed to achieve.6 Statutes of limita-
tions were drawn as statutes of repose to prevent assertion of claims after
the evidence had disappeared, to give effect to the interest of the community
in the security of titles, and to give protection to the ostensible owner of the
land over a long period of time.7 A possessor's use and occupation of land
which he believes to be his own is hostile to all the world. The fallacy in relying
upon "subjective intention" lies in placing too much emphasis upon what
the innocent mistaken possessor would have intended had the facts been
known to him, and too little emphasis upon the real facts-the actual, visible,
and notorious possession and use of the land under a mistaken claim of right.
What a person has actually done should be given greater weight than what
he would have done had he not been mistaken.8
The prevailing rule in Tennessee, established first in Erck v. Church,,
is in accord with the majority rule in stating that possession of land under
an honest mistake as to the boundary line will ripen into title when held and
used for the statutory period. It was said in effect that the visible and physical
fact of possession should not be overcome by the mere refinements of what
the possessor would have done had the facts been known to him, because in
that event the law would be more favorable to the dishonest intentional wrong-
doer than to the possessor under an honest mistake.10 The rule thus pro-
mulgated was reaffirmed and followed in Williams v. Hewitt," which sought
to distinguish all the preceding cases thought to be in conflict. 12 However, in
Buchanan v. Nixon,"3 emphasis was placed upon hostile subjective intention,
5. For further discussion on this subject see Bordwell, Mistake and Adverse Posses-
sion, 7 IowA L. BULL. 129 (1922); Darling, Adverse Possession in Boundary Cases, 19
OR. L. REv. 117 (1940) ; Fuller, Adverse Possession--Occupying of Another's Land Un-
der Mistake as to Location of a Boundary, 7 ORE. L. REV. 329 (1928) ; 1 ALA. L. REV. 80
(1948) ; 10 COL. L. REv. 665 (1910) ; 14 FORDHAm L. REV. 219 (1945); 26 Ky. L. J. 248
(1938); 11 MiNN. L. REv. 457 (1927); 11 RocxY Mr. L. REV. 214 (1939); 16 TEXAS L.
REV. 562 (1938) ; 4 Wis. L. REv. 41 (1926).
6. Hackett, Judicial Conflict-Mistake in Boundary Lines, 9 HAR. L. RrV. 464 (1896).
7. 4 TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1134 (3d ed., Jones, 1939); 15 VA. L. REV. 498
(1929) ; 12 VA. L. REv. 675 (1926).
8. French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680 (1831) ; Ovig v. Morrison, 142
Wis. 243, 125 N. W. 449 (1910) ; 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 44 (1939) ; 1 R. C. L., Adverse
Possession § 11 (1914).
9. 87 Tenn. 575, 11 S. W. 794 (1889) (subjective intention held immaterial but two
successive adverse possessors not allowed to tack their holding periods).
10. Id. at 580, 11 S. W. at 795.
11. 128 Tenn. 689, 164 S. W. 1198 (1914) (adverse claimant inclosed adjoining land).
12. Id. at 691, 164 S. W. at 1199 (distinction made "between an accidental possession
held by actual inclosure, and an accidental possession of a part of a large tract, and a claim
of actual possession of the entire boundary under color of title").
13. 163 Tenn. 364, 43 S. W. 2d 380, 80 A. L. R. 151 (1931) (owner of tract excluded
portion of his land by fence and neighbor built garage along the incorrect fence line;
neighbor held not to have possession adversely because of the mistake).
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and it was said that if a mistake was made, where the intent was to hold
only to the true boundary line, then the' possession would not be adverse.
14
The difficulty with this case, as pointed out in subsequent decisions,15 is that
it disregards the possessor's actual intent and emphasizes what would have
been his intent had he known the facts. The instant case neither expressly
overrules nor expressly affirms Buchanan v. Nixon, but since actual posses-
sion and use are held the determining factors in mistaken boundary line cases,
the force of that decision must be regarded as somewhat weakened. In the
Buchanan case an attempt was made to distinguish between cases where the
adverse possessor had inclosed land of his neighbor within his fence and
cases where the owner of land has accidentally failed to inclose all of his
own land; in the latter cases it was said that one using the uninclosed portion
did not hold adversely to the true owner unless he held with hostile intention.
Since Erck v. Church and Williams v. Hewitt involved inclosure by the ad-
verse claimant, the court in the Buchanan case regarded them as distinguish-
able and stated that the rule of those cases would be confined closely to the
factual situation presented in them.' 6 While the principal case falls within
that factual pattern, its emphasis upon actual possession rather than subjective
intention seems to indicate that in the future it may not be important whether
the adverse claimant or the true owner establishes the boundary line.
TAXATION-EXEMPTION OF PROPERTY USED FOR CHARITABLE PUR-
POSES-APARTMENTS RENTED TO DISABLED VETERANS BELOW COST
Plaintiff, a corporation not for profit, owned apartment buildings which
it rented to disabled veterans and their families at a rental below cost.
Plaintiff applied for exemption of this property from state taxation under
a statute I which allowed exemption of property used exclusively for chari-
table purposes. Held (5-2), exemption denied on the ground that the use of
the property was primarily for furnishing low-rent housing and not ex-
clusively for charitable purposes. Beerman Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 87 N. E. 2d 474 (Ohio 1949).
Generally throughout the states, provision is made for the exemption
from state taxation of property used for charitable purposes.2 However, by
14. Id. at 369, 43 S. W. 2d at 382, 80 A. L. R. at 153.
15. Gibson v. Shular, 29 Tenn. App. 166, 169, 194 S. W. 2d 865 (E. S. 1946) (adverse
claimant included adjoining land within his fence; subjective intention held immaterial
and Buchanan case held distinguishable on its facts) ; People v. Hagaman, 215 S. W. 2d
827, 829 (Tenn. App. E. S. 1948) (stating that the distinction made in Williams v. Hewitt
was overlooked in the Buchanan case). See Note, 80 A. L. R. 155, 157 (1932).
16. Buchanan v. Nixon, 163 Tenn. 364, 367, 435 S. W. 2d 380, 80 A. L. R. 151 (1931).
1. OHio GEN. CODE ANN, § 5353 (1945).
2. 51 Am. JUR., Taxation § 606 (1944) ; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 682 (4th ed., Nichols,
1924). For general discussion of tax exemption provisions in the various states, see Baker,
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the great weight of authority, property owned by a charitable institution but
rented out or otherwise held for revenue is not entitled to exemption, even
though the funds derived from such use are devoted to the purposes of the
institution claiming the exemption.3 This rule was prompted by a feeling
that property used in competition with commercial enterprises ought to share
the burden of taxation with all other commercially used property. 4 That the
rule excludes from exemption more than was intended to be excluded by it
is evidenced by the fact that in certain instances it is ignored by the very
courts which declared it.5
In the case of hospitals and charitable homes particularly, it is a well
established principle that the buildings used by such institutions may be
exempt even though those inmates who are able to pay for the benefits af-
forded them are required to do so, if no profit is made by the institution and
the amounts received are applied in furthering the purposes of the institu-
tion. 6 From this, many courts have concluded that it is also immaterial if
all recipients of benefits are required to pay for them, where the amount
received does not exceed the expenses and the institution is not maintained
for profit.7 In either instance, it is clear that the property yields a return,
yet such revenue is apparently regarded as incidental to the primary use of
the property.
In the case of public housing projects for low-income families, the
property is clearly "rented out" to individual families, yet here, too, the
Tax Exemption Statutes, 7 TEXAS L. REV. 50 (1928); Hughes, Tax Exemptions, 13
TENN. L. REV. 79 (1935). For a discussion of tax exemptions of charitable institutions,
see Heisel, Exemption from Taxation of Property Used for Religious, Educational, and
Charitable Purposes in Ohio, 3 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 40 (1929) ; Notes, 35 ILL. L. REV.
861 (1941), 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 724 (1932). Similar provisions are often made for the
exemption of property used for educational or religious purposes, and for public purposes.
Since in all such cases, the problems of use and of purpose are substantially similar, the
material cited herein is not always restricted to that involving only charitable institutions.
3. People ex rel. Baldwin v. Jessamine Withers Home, 312 Ill. 136, 143 N. E. 414,
34 A. L. R. 628 (1924) ; Fitterer v. Crawford, 157 Mo. 51, 57 S. W. 532, 50 L. R. A. 191
(1900). Cf. City of Mattoon v. Graham, 386 Ill. 180, 53 N. E. 2d 955 (1944) (municipally-
owned property not used for municipal purposes), where the court said, "If property,
however owned, is let for a return, it is used for profit and so far as its liability to the
burden of taxation is concerned, it is irrelevant whether the owner makes a profit or
sustains a loss." 53 N. E. 2d at 958. But cf. Vanderbilt University v. Cheney, 116 Tenn.
259, 94 S. W. 90 (1906). See 51 Am. JUR., Taxation § 608 (1944) ; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION
§ 686 (4th ed., Nichols, 1924). For collections of cases, see Notes, 34 A. L. R. 659 (1925),
62 A. L. R. 334 (1929), 108 A. L. R. 292 (1937), 50 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1197 (1914).
4. See Note, 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 724, 728 (1932).
5. See infra notes 6, 7 and 8.
6. Dayton v. Speers Hospital, 165 Ky. 56, 176 S. W. 361, L. R. A. 1917B 779, Ann.
Cas. 1917B 275 (1917) ; O'Brien v. Physicians' Hospital Ass'n, 96 Ohio St. 1, 116 N. E.
975, L. R. A. 1917F 741 (1917) ; Tulsa County v. St. John's Hospital, 191 P. 2d 983
(Okla. 1948). See 51 Am. Jua., Taxation §§ 602, 625, 636 (1944) ; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION
§ 739 (4th ed., Nichols, 1924).
7. Bishop and Chapter v. Treasurer, 37 Colo. 378, 86 Pac. 1021 (1906); Franklin
Square House v. Boston, 188 Mass. 409, 74 N. E. 675 (1905) ; City of Asbury Park v.
Salvation Army. 26 N. J. Misc. 170, 58 A. 2d 216 (Dep't of Tax. and Fin. 1948) ; Webster
Apartments v. New York, 118 Misc. 91, 193 N. Y. Supp. 650 (Sup. Ct. 1922). Contra:
Guild of St. Barnabas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 484, 83 N. E. 2d 229 (19481;
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rule is not usually invoked. Where the property of public housing authorities
has not been exempted from taxation by specific legislation, the courts have
almost universally found as a basis for exemption that the property is used
either for public or for charitable purposes.8
These cases seem to indicate a growing realization that the yielding of
income need not necessarily render the use of property commercial. In other
words, property may be used to serve a charitable or any other non-com-
mercial purpose even though some payment of money is involved. Certainly
there is no appreciable difference in the ultimate benefit to society when the
property is used to provide free lodging accommodations for suitable objects
of charity, 9 and when it is employed in the manner and for the purposes
claimed by plaintiff in the principal case. Yet the Ohio court has consistently
held to the rule that property rented out or otherwise held for revenue is
not entitled to exemption. 10 The holding in the principal case is only one
of several such holdings which have resulted from this rigid adherence to a
rule that seems too broad for realistic application to all situations.
TORTS-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER OF CHEMICAL DUST-
IMPOSITION OF STRICT LIABILITY FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE
When the vendee of a new chemical dust known as 2-4-D sprayed his
rice crop by airplane, part of the substance drifted three-quarters of a mile
through the air to the plaintiff's cotton field, severely damaging it. No tests
had been made by the manufacturer to determine the floating quality of
2-4-D though he knew and had informed the vendee of the product's in-
jurious effect on cotton plants. Evidence showed that no similar dust sprayed
by air had ever spread more than 150 feet. The vendee, when sued, joined
the manufacturer as a co-defendant. The jury found no negligence on the
see the principal case, 87 N. E. 2d at 476. See 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 739 (4th ed., Nichols,
1924).
8. Bader Realty v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 217 S. W. 2d 489, 492 (Mo. 1949)
("That this is charity of the most practical character we are firmly convinced"). Contra:
Dayton Housing Authority v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 10, 53 N. E. 2d 896, 152 A. L. R. 223
(1944); Columbus Housing Authority v. Thatcher, 140 Ohio St. 38, 42 N. E. 2d 437
(1942). For collections of cases, see Notes, 133 A. L. R. 365 (1941), 152 A. L. R. 239
(1944).
9. Even as early as 1601, disabled veterans were recognized as suitable recipients of
charity. Among the charitable purposes set forth in the preamble to the Statute of Chari-
table Uses, 1601, 43 ELIz., c. 4, is found the following: "Maintenance of sick and maimed
Soldiers and Mariners. . . ." While the list of charitable purposes mentioned in the pre-
amble to the statute is not now considered exhaustive, all of the purposes mentioned
therein are still held to be charitable. See 2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 368 (1935).
10. E.g., Guild of St. Barnabas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 484, 83 N. E.
2d 229 (1948) (home where all occupants paid nominal fee; held, used for low rent housing,
not exclusively for charitable purposes) ; Columbus Housing Authority v. Thatcher, 140
Ohio St. 38, 42 N. E. 2d 437 (1942) (housing for low-income families; held, since rent
is required of each family, purpose of the use is rental, and property not entitled to
exemption).
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part of the vendee, but held the manufacturer liable for breach of a duty to
test the floating quality of this inherently dangerous product. Held (4-2-1),'
affirmed. The test of the vendee's liability was correctly that of reasonable
care, whereas the manufacturer was properly held on the basis of strict
liability. Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 222 S. W. 2d 820 (Ark. 1949).
Stemming from Winterbottom v. Wright 2 there developed the rule
that a manufacturer was liable in tort only to those in privity of contract
with him,3 but the courts gradually made "exceptions" to this rule,4 the
principal one of which was that if a product was "inherently dangerous" to
human safety the manufacturer might be liable for negligence to a remote
vendee. 5 This old "general rule" with its "exceptions" has been supplanted
in a majority of the states by the doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.G
that a manufacturer of a product is liable without privity of contract for
negligence resulting in personal injury when it is reasonably foreseeable that
negligence may make the product dangerous to human safety.7 Likewise,
courts following the MacPherson doctrine of foreseeability, after some hesi-
tation, have seemed generally ready to extend it to cover property damage
sustained by a remote vendee or third party.
8
1. Opinion by Frank G. Smith, J.; partial dissent by George Rose Smith, J., with
written opinion that judgment against manufacturer should be reversed; partial dissents by
Holt and McFaddin, JJ. (no opinion) on the ground that judgment for vendee should be
reversed.
2. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
3. See Stone v. Van Noy R. News Co., 153 Ky. 240, 154 S. W. 1092 (1913) ; Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S. W. 1009, L. R. A. 1916A 940,
Ann. Cas. 1917A 179 (1915) ; Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150
S. W. 421 (1912) ; Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157, 23 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 876 (1909).
4. The opinion of Sanborn, J., in Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120
Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903) contains the classic analysis of these exceptions. As finally
developed, the exceptions imposing liability on a manufacturer for negligence applied when
(1) the manufacturer had not disclosed to the vendee a known danger involved in the use
of the product; (2) the product was furnished for use on the premises of the vendee's
A. L. R. 449 (1945) (poisonous fumes from can of dry-cleaner); RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 83 (1941) ; Note, 40 HARv. L. REv. 886 (1927).
5. E.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852); Boyd v. Coca
Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W. 80 (1915).
6. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916) ; Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturer,
19 MINN. L. REv. 752 (1935).
7. E.g., McClaren-v. Weber Bros. Shoe Co., 166 Fed. 714 (1st Cir. 1909) (defective
sewing machine in factory) ; Jacobs v. Adams Electric Co., 198 Mo. 495, 97 S. W. 2t
849 (1936) (employee injured while installing product supplied to employer) ; McLeod v.
Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S. W. 2d 122 (1927) (injury to bystander) ; La
Frumento v. Kotex Co., 131 Misc. 314, 226 N. Y. Supp. 750 (N. Y. City Ct. 1928) (sanitary
napkin containing a pin) ; Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A. 2d 850, 16&
A. L. R. 449 (1945) (poisonous fumes from can of dry-cleaner) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 395 (1934) ; Clark, Let the Maker Beware, 19 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 85, 94 (1945) ; 39
MIcH. L. REv. 1116 (1940).
8. E.g.,.Spencer v. Madsen, 142 F. 2d 820 (10th Cir. 1944) ; E. I. Du Pont de Nemours.
& Co. v. Baridon, 73 F. 2d 26 (8th Cir. 1934) ; United States Radiator Corp. v. Henderson,
68 F. 2d 87 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Kolberg v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 93 Cal. App. 609, 269
Pac. 975 (1928) ; Ebers v. General Chemical Co., 310 Mich. 261, 17 N. W. 2d 176 (1945) ;
Bosch v. Damm, 296 Mich. 522, 296 N. W. 669 (1941) ; Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390,
225 N. W. 395 (1929) ; Fire Relief Ass'n v. Sonneborn, 263 N. Y. 463, 189 N. E. 551
(1934) ; Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N. Y. Supp. 131 (3d
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Most courts have realized that even though an article may be properly
constructed, its use may still involve certain hazards or dangers. By the
weight of authority, not only is it the duty of a manufacturer to use care
commensurate with the harm likely to result from a defect,9 but also the
exercise of due care may require the manufacturer to make tests to ascertain
the safety of a product for its intended use, 10 and to give adequate warnings
of any discovered dangers."
Instead of reciting the general standard of care to the jury and leaving
to them the question of whether in the exercise of reasonable care the manu-
facturer should have made tests, the trial judge in his charge to the jury in
the instant case set forth a specific rule that a manufacturer of an inherently
dangerous product must make tests and that failure to do so constitutes
negligence. 12 Such specific rules of conduct are occasionally prescribed by
the courts, 13 and are entirely consistent with the idea of negligence as the
basis for liability.
The appellate court held there was sufficient evidence to warrant the
jury's finding that the vendee was not negligent. In approving the charge
concerning the manufacturer, the court seemingly went further than other
courts have yet gone in stating that the manufacturer was responsible on
Dep't 1915). Contra: Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Supply Co., 171 Misc. 157,
11 N. Y. S. 2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 747, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 424 (2d Dep't
1939).
9. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F. 2d 26 (8th Cir. 1934); Bird
v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 590 (W. D. N. Y. 1936) ; Employers' Liability Assur. Corp.
v. Columbus McKinnon Chain Co., 13 F. 2d 128 (W. D. N. Y. 1926); Lill v. Murphy
Door Bed Co., 290 Ill. App. 328, 8 N. E. 2d 714 (1937); Pa'yton v. Childers Electric Co.,
228 Ky. 44, 14 S. W. 2d 208 (1929) ; Johnson v. Stoddard, 310 Mass. 232, 37 N. E. 2d 505,
140 A. L. R. 186 C1941); Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 353 Mo. 558, 183 S. W. 2d 140, 156
A. L. R. 469 (1944). Contra: Ensign-Bickford Co. v. Reeves, 95 F. 2d 190 (8th Cir.
1938); St. Louis Fireworks Co. v. Wilson, 5 Tenn. C. C. A. 388 (1915).
10. Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878, 8 A. L. R. 1023 (2d Cir. 1919);
Cashwell v. Bottling Co., 174 N. C. 324, 93 S. E. 901 (1917) ; Heckel v. Ford Motor Co.,
101 N. J. L. 385, 128 Atl. 242, 39 A. L. R. 989 (1925) ; Holzman v. Harkavy Beverage
Co., 250 App. Div. 271, 293 N. Y. Supp 832 (1st Dep't 1937); Hoenig v. Central Stamping
Co., 247 App. Div. 895, 287 N. Y. Supp. 118 (2d Dep't 1936); Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers
Stove Co., 182 Wis. 94, 195 N. W. 388 (1923).
11. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P. 2d 1 (1948) ; Kentucky Independent
Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 271 S. W. 570 (1925) ; Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319
Mass. 92, 64 N. E. 2d 693, 164 A. L. R. 559 (1946) ; Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N. Y.
478, 88 N. E. 1063 (1909) ; Noone v. Perlberg, Inc., 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N. Y. S. 2d
460 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd, 294 N. Y. 680, 60 N. E. 2d 839 (1945) ; Henry v. Crook, 202
App. Div. 19, 195 N. Y. Supp. 642 (3d Dep't 1922) ; Note, 44 MIcH. L. Rlv. 1157 (1946).
if the buyer discovers the danger the manufacturer is not liable. Olds Motor Works v.
Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S. W. 1047 (1911); cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn.
392, f[92 S. W. 2d 840 (1945).
12. "It was the duty of the defendant . . . before putting an inherently dangerous.
product on the market to make tests to determine whether or not it would damage crops
of others; if you believe ... that such tests were not made, then you are told that the
defendant ... is negligent." 222 S. W. 2d at 826.
13. E.g., Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24, 72 L. Ed.
167, 56 A. L. R. 645 (1927) ("stop, look, and listen" rule at railroad crossing) ; Serfas v.
Lehigh & N. E. R. R., 270 Pa. 306, 113 AtI. 370, 14 A. L. R. 791 (1921) (negligence to
drive at speed making it impossible to stop within range of vision) ; Schwartz v. Johnson,
152 Tenn. 586, 280 S. W. 32, 47 A. L. R. 323 (1926) (negligence to ride with driver
Imown to be drunk).
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the basis of strict liability-apparently in the belief that it was necessary to
take this position in order to justify the instruction. The principle of strict
liability is not a recent development of the law.14 Since Rylands v. Fletcher'5
there has been an extension of the principle into many different fields 15 until
today its application to the consequences of engaging in an ultra-hazardous
activity, or utilizing an inherently dangerous substance, is becoming widely
recognized.' 7 However, this court in its rationale seems to misapply the
principle of strict liability for harm ensuing from an ultra-hazardous ac-
tivity,' 8 and to have confused with it the "inherently dangerous" concept
based on negligence which was an exception to the old general rule of non-
liability of manufacturers.19 Moreover, the court in a concluding statement
said that ordinary care required that the manufacturer should know of the
peculiar carrying quality of the dust in view of the dangerous nature of the
product, and that it was charged with the knowledge which tests would have
revealed. The court then asserts that the "case is therefore one in which
the rtle of strict liability should be applied." 20 These statements are logically
inconsistent. If "ordinary care" is the standard, then the liability could not
be absolute, because under the principles of strict liability a defendant may
be liable notwithstanding his exercise of even the highest degree of care.21
Since justice demands that the manufacturer be held liable 22 in many
situations where it is almost impossible to prove negligence,23 a large number
of courts have virtually imposed strict liability in certain types of situations
14. PROSSER, TORTS § 59 (1941); RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 507 (1938).
15. L. R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868); Bohlen, The Ruile ifn
Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 298 (1911); Thayer, Liability Without Fault,
29 HARV. L. REv. 801 (1916).
16. E.g., Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952, 60 A. L. R.
475 (1928) (drilling oil well); Knoxville v. Peebles, 19 Tenn. App. 340, 87 S. W. 2d
1022 (W. S. 1935) (blasting); Weaver Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond, 68 W. Va. 530,
70 S. E. 126 (1911) (water) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 61 (1941) ; Carpenter, The Doctrine of
Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 5 So. CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1932).
17. "[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person,
land or chattels the actor should recggnize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable
miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity
ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm." RESTATEMFENT,
TORTS § 519 (1938). "The rule stated in this Section applies only to such harm as results
from a risk which, being incapable of elimination by the utmost precaution, care and skill,
makes the activity ultrahazardous." Id. at § 519, comment b.
18. "An activity is ultrahazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm
to the person, land or chattels of others which can not be eliminated by the exercise of the
utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage." RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 520
(1938).
19. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
20. 222 S. W. 2d at 827.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436, 440-44 (1944)
(bottle explosion); Harris, Liability Without Fault, 6 TULANE L. REV. 337 (1932);
Russell, Manufacturers' Liability to the Ultimate Consumer, 21 Ky. L. J. 388 (1933);
Seefeld, Tort Liability of Manufacturers to Users of Their Goods, 25 MARQ. L. REv.
173, 191 (1941).
23. Swenson v. Purity Baking Co., 183 Minn. 289, 236 N. W. 310 (1931); Note, 2
VAND. L. Rzv. 675, 685 (1949).
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on the bases of implied warranty,24 misrepresentation, 25 nuisance, 26 or pro-
cedural devices such as res ipsa loquitur. 27 As yet these are scattered instances
and no general principle has developed, but it "would seem desirable . . . for
the courts to recognize in name the absolute liability which in substance is
fast becoming established by means of legal fiction." 28
Even though the court in the instant case apparently founded its decision
on divergent and dissimilar principles of law, the holding that the manu-
facturer is liable seems to be justified. Most courts at the present time would
have left the question of negligence to the jury under the general standard
of care. The procedure of the trial court in laying down a specific rule of
conduct for the jury's guidance is not extremely unusual. The appellate
court's holding of liability on the ground of strict liability may foreshadow
a result which the other courts will soon reach, because the manufacturer can
best distribute the loss, and "ultimately those who enjoy the goods and
services will pay for the losses which result from making them available." 29
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT OVER ON DEATH WITHOUT
ISSUE WHEN SPECIFIED TIME FOR TAKING POSSESSION
IS MENTIONED BY TESTATOR
Testator devised a tract of land "to my granddaughter . . . to go into
her possession when she marries or becomes of age if she dies without
bodily heirs then I give it to be divided between" B, C, and D, children of the
testator. Some years after the death of testator, the granddaughter became
of age and took possession of the land. She subsequently conveyed the land
to defendants for a cash consideration; later she died without bodily heirs.
B, C, and D all died before the granddaughter. Complainants, legal heirs
of D, sue for a one-half interest in the tract of land, claiming that the
will conveyed to the granddaughter only a life estate with remainder to
B, C, and D, and that on her death without bodily heirs complainants took
24. Bufkin v. Grisham, 157 Miss:746, 128 So. 563 (1930) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Works
v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927); Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609,
164 S. W. 2d 828, 142 A. L. R. 1479 (1942).
25. Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F. 2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937); Baxter v. Ford
Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409, 88 A. L. R. 521 (1932).
26. King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152 F. 2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945) ; United Electric
Light Co. v. Deliso Constr. Co., 315 Mass. 313, 52 N. E. 2d 553 (1943); Taylor v. Cin-
cinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N. E. 2d 724 (1944).
27. Nichols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 F. 2d 141 (3d Cir. 1929); Dierman v.
Providence Hospital, 31 Cal. 2d 290, 188 P. 2d 12 (1947) ; Patterson, The Apportionment
of B siness Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 CoL. L. REV. 335 (1924) ; Notes, 33 COL L.
REv. 868 (1933), 61 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1948).
28. Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134, 157 (1937) ; Note, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 621 (1935).
29. Note, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 269, 275 (1949); Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a
Factor in the Decision of Certain Tvpes of Tort Cases. 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 805 (1930).
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the remainder interest. Held, bill dismissed. This item of the will vested in
the granddaughter the absolute estate in the realty qualified only by a
limitation over in the event that she should die without bodily heirs before
coming into possession of the land. Williams v. Gupton, R. D. No. 12062,
Chancery Court of Montgomery County, Tennessee (6th Chan. Div., Mar-
able, C., Sept. 19, 1949).
The problem of determining what the testator actually means when he
provides for a devise "to A but if A dies without issue, then to B" has per-
plexed courts and lawyers since the beginnings of the common law.' In
the easier case of a devise "to A but if A dies, then to B," the courts have
for all practical purposes reached unanimity of construction.2 Here the testa-
tor uses language importing a contingency, but clearly there is nothing
contingent about the death of A; it is certain to happen. Thus the courts,
construing the testator's probable intent, supply the contingency, by inter-
preting the language to mean "to A but if A dies before T dies, then to B." a
As a result, the gift over is valid only if A dies before the testator.
4
This reasoning, however, does not apply so forcefully where the testator
provides for the gift over to B if A dies without issue. In that case the
testator presents an actual contingency, i.e., A may or may not die without
issue, and thus there is no necessity for the court to supply the contingency.0
Logically, it might seem that the testator intended the gift over to be effec-
tive upon the death of A without issue whenever that might happen; and
some courts hold to this effect, that if A dies without issue at any time, B
takes.6 But the majority view is that A's death must occur before that of
the testator for the gift over to take effect.1 Once A survives the testator
1. Amram, Pennsylvania Rules for Construction of the Words "Die Without Issue,"
79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 15 (1930); Warren, Gifts Over on Death Without Issue, 39
YALE L. J. 332 (1930); Notes, 20 TEXAS L. Rv. 212 (1941); 18 U. OF CIN. L. REV.
311 (1949).
2. For a general discussion of the subjects covered see: 57 Am. JUR., Wills §§ 1236-
55 (1948) ; 69 C. J., Wills §§ 1324-39, 1553-54, 1570-79 (1934); 3 PAGE, WILLS §§ 1138-
41, 1291-93 (Perm. ed. 1941); 2 SIMES, FuTURE INTERESTS §§ 326-46 (1936).
3. "When indeed a devise is made to one person in fee, and 'in case of his death'
to another in fee, the absurdity of speaking of the one event which is sure to occur to
all living as uncertain and contingent has led the courts to interpret the devise over
as referring only to death in testator's lifetime." Britton v. Thornton, 112 U. S. 526,
532-33, 5 Sup. Ct. 291, 28 L. Ed. 816 (1884).
4. E.g., Tomlin v. Laws, 301 IIl. 616, 134 N. E. 24, 26 A. L. R. 606 (1922) (rule
not changed by fact that the will was made when testator had met with a fatal accident
and was contemplating death at any time, and before birth of first taker); Fisher v.
Eggert, 64 Atl. 957 (N. J. Ch. 1906) (rule recognized but not followed because of
showing of contrary intent of testator) ; Katzenberger v. Weaver, 110 Tenn. 620, 630,
75 S. W. 937, 939 (1903) (" 'Hence it has become an established rule, that where the
bequest is simply to A., and in case of his death, or if he die, to B., A. surviving the
testator takes absolutely' ").
5. Tnoam'soN, WILLS § 226a (3d ed. 1947).
6. Harvey v. Bell, 118 Ky. 512, 81 S. W. 671 (1904); Briggs v. Hopkins, 103
Ohio St. 321, 132 N. E. 843 (1921); O'Mahoney v. Burdett, L. R. 7 H. L. 388 (1874).
See Note, 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1045, 1056-59, 1076-8.3 (1910); Notes, 8 COL. L. Rv.
37 (1908), 18 U. OF GIN. L. Rav. 311, 314 (1949).
7. 69 C. J., Wills § 1332 n. 13 (1934) ; 28 R. C. L., Wills § 231 (1921). See Note,
25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1045, 1059-64, 1108-18 (1910).
[ VOL. 3
RECENT CASES
and takes the devise, then his estate is held to become absolute and non-
defeasible.
8
Historically, the reason for the majority holding is perhaps found in
the fact that the common law held that "death without issue" referred to
an indefinite failure of issue, i.e., the death without issue of the last survivor
of A's line.9 Under this indefinite failure theory, the courts were forced to
choose between the two constructions, that of giving A the fee absolute
once he takes upon T's death and that of giving A's line an estate defeasible
perhaps for generations; and they understandably chose the former. 10 With
the general abolition of the fee tail estate 11 and the adoption of the "definite"
failure of issue theory,' 2 a court is no longer faced with this dilemma and
the historical reason for the holding disappears. 13 The modern courts, how-
ever, to effect the same holding generally use another theory, the substitu-
tional or anti-lapse construction, which presumes that T intended to provide
for the death of A without issue only so that if A died without issue before T
dies, the gift over would go to B and would not lapse back into T's estate.
14
8. E.g., Ewart v. Dalby, 319 Mo. 108, 5 S. W. 2d 428 (1928), 24 ILL. L. Rav. 252
(1929) (clause "and if she dies single and unmarried and without issue" held to mean
such death before death of testator) ; Schnitter v. McManahan, 85 Neb. 337, 123 N. W.
299, 27 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1047 (1909) (rule recognized but held to yield to slight showing
of contrary intent of testator); Scruggs v. Mayberry, 135 Tenn. 586, 188 S. W. 207
(1916); Katzenberger v. Weaver, 110 Tenn. 620, 75 S. W. 937 (1903); Meacham v.
Graham, 98 Tenn. 190, 39 S. W. 12 (1897); Vaughn v. Cator, 85 Tenn. 302, 2 S. W.
262 (1886). It has been said that the rule is one of property law. Frank v. Frank, 120
Tenn. 569, 575, 111 S. W. 1119, 1120 (1908). But the better view is that the rule is
merely one of construction, which will yield to a showing of a contrary intent of the
testator. Eckhardt v. Phillips, 176 Tenn. 34, 137 S. W. 2d 301 (1940), 16 TENN. L.
REv. 479; Truett v. Cook, 5 Tenn. C. C. A. 456 (1915) (rule held not to apply where
testator was physician afflicted with typhoid and on death bed, and devise was to son
then only one year old) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Tenn. C. C. A. 118 (1914).
9. Under the indefinite failure theory, A in effect takes an estate in tail, his line
retaining the estate until the last of this line without issue, when the gift over becomes
effective and B or B's heir takes the estate in fee simple. 11 R. C. L., Wills § 19 (1921).
10. Theories of contruction favor vested rather than contingent estates, and favor
the early vesting of absolute estates. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 108 Tenn. 21, 24, 64 S. W.
483, 484 (1901); Bridgewater v. Gordon, 34 Tenn. 5, 10 (1854); 57 Am. Ju., Wills
§ 1218 (1948).
11. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 7599 (Williams, 1934). See Shinn, Limitations Over
On Dying Without Issue and the Abolition of Estates Tail, 21 VA. L. Rav. 286 (1934).
It should be noted that if the statute abolishing estates tail turns them into fees simple,
the gift over would ordinarily leave an executory interest, which, if limited to take
effect on an indefinite failure of issue, would be void under the rule against perpetuities.
Dennett v. Dennett, 43 N. H. 499 (1862). See 2 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 343 (1936) ;
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPaTY § 44 (3d ed., Jones, 1939). In Parrish's Heirs v. Ferris,
6 Ohio St. 563, 579 (1856), the court points out that a statute against entailments in-
fluenced'their decision to adopt the definite failure construction.
12. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 7601 (Williams, 1934).
13. The problem then becomes a much harder one, that of choosing between the
alternatives, (a) of the gift over to B if A dies without issue whenever he does die, a
perfectly reasonable interpretation, and (b) of the gift over to B only if A dies without
issue before T dies. England by statute adopted the definite failure theory in 1837,
7 WILL. and 1 VicT., c. 26, § 29; the rule in England is that "death without issue"
means death of the devisee at any time.
14. Palmer v. French, 326 Mo. 710, 32 S. W. 2d 591, 594 (1930) ("The intention
of the testator is presumed to be to prevent a lapse") ; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433.
37 N. E. 515, 516 (1894) ("Ordinary prudence required [the testator] . . . to guard
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This anti-lapse argument is complete in itself, and may be used to effect
the desired holding whether the jurisdiction follows the definite or indefinite
failure theory and regardless of the situation as to fee tail estates.1"
The formula, "to A but if A dies without issue, then to B," may
take varied forms. Thus, testators frequently insert a further provision
giving a preceding life estate to W, so that the devise goes "to W for life,
remainder to A in fee, but if A dies without issue, then to B." In this situs-
tion the courts have generally reasoned that the time of A's death should
be referred to the termination of the preceding life estate in order to detei-
mine the contingency, with the result that if A survives the holder of the
antecedent life estate, his interest becomes absolute and the gift over fails.,"
The rationale of this holding is that T has set up an event of a definite time,
to which the contingency of A's death without issue may be referred, and
thus there is no need for the court to .supply the event of T's death as this
point of time. 17 This holding has been rejected in England and Canada and
in a few American jurisdictions, where the more literal view is taken that
in the absence of a showing of contrary intent, the testator will be presumed
to have intended a death without issue at any time.18 A few cases in this
country have applied the presumption that in this situation a death prior
to the testator's was intended. 19
A further variation may be made in this type of devise by the testator's
mentioning or indicating some point of time intermediate between the death
of T and that of the devisee, as the time when distribution is to take place,
or when the devisee is to enter into possession or full enjoyment of the gift.2 0
against intestacy as to the share of a son who might die without issue before the will
should take effect"); Meacham v. Graham, 98 Tenn. 190, 39 S. W. 12 (1897).
15. Frank v. Frank, 120 Tenn. 569, 111 S. W. 1119 (1908) (definite failure statute
did not change the substitutionary rule). Contra: Kirkman v. Smith, 175 N. C. 579,
96 S. E. 51 (1918).
16. E.g., Harrington v. Cooper, 126 Ark. 53, 189 S. W. 667 (1916) ; Rankin v.
Rankin, 227 Ky. 169, 12 S. W. 2d 319 (1928); Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180
S. W. 176 (1915) ; see Cook v. Collier, 62 S. W. 658, 660 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1901) ; Note,
25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1045, 1067-69, 1127-30 (1910).
17. "The rule is well established . . . the testator is held to contemplate a death
during the continuance of the particular estate, unless a contrary intent is found in the
will." Baird v. Garman, 349 Ill. 597, 182 N. E. 739, 740 (1932). It should be noted that
this rationale may be used in states following either the substitutional theory, Booth v.
Eberly, 124 Md. 22, 91 Atl. 767 (1914); Hohnbach v. Hohnbach, 151 Wis. 487, 139
N. W. 731 (1913) ; or in states following the non-substitutional theory, Spacey v. Close,
184 Ky. 523, 212 S. W. 127 (1919); Davis v. Scharf, 99 N. J. Eq. 714, 133 Atl. 197
(Ch. 1926).
18. Gavvin v. Carroll, 276 Ill. 478, 114 N. E. 927 (1916); Brown v. Gardner, 233
N. Y. 261, 135 N. E. 325 (1922); Ziegler v. Love, 185 N. C. 40, 115 S. E. 887 (1923);
Davis v. Hodge, 102 S. C. 178, 86 S. E. 478 (1915); Eggleston v. Swartz, 145 Wis.
106, 129 N. W. 48 (1910); O'Mahoney v. Burdett, L. R. 7 H. L. 388 (1874). See
Note, 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1045, 1067-69, 1127-30 (1910).
19. E.g., Moore v. Cook, 153 Ga. 840, 113 S. E. 526 (1922) ; Duzan v. Chappel,
41 Ind. App. 651, 84 N. E. 775 (1908); Tarbell v. Smith, 125 Iowa 388, 101 N. W.
118 (1904) ; Stokes v. Weston, 142 N. Y. 433, 37 N. E. 515 (1894).
20. To A upon his reaching certain age: Horrocks v. Basham, 139 Ark. 116, 213
S. W. 372 (1919); Bishop v. McClelland's Ex'rs, 44 N. J. Eq. 450, 16 Atl. 1, 1 L. R. A.
551 (Ch. 1888); Colby v. Doty, 158 N. Y. 323, 53 N. E. 35 (1899); Jones v. Jones.
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The instant case presents such a situation, where the devise is "to A, A to
go into possession upon reaching majority or upon marriage, but if A dies
without issue then to B." The question of construction here is closely analo-
gous to that presented by the devise containing the preceding life estate,2 1
and the holding usually is to the same effect, upon a like rationale, that the
operation of the contingency is restricted to the period before the mentioned
point of time.22 Upon analysis of T's probable intent, it would seem that
there should be no difference in the holdings for the two types of situations.
Thus the holding in the instant case seems well taken.
All of these rules are merely rules of construction, to be used in situa-
tions where T's intent is at best doubtful, and all must yield to a showing of
a contrary intent of the testator.2 3 It is only when the testator's intention is
not apparent that the rules of construction need be used at all, for the very
purpose of the construction of a will is to ascertain the testator's intention.2 4
48 Ohio App. 138, 192 N. E. 811 (1933), 10 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 325 (1935). Time of
distribution of estate held in trust: Hanna v. Prewitt, 153 Ky. 310, 155 S. W. 726
(1913) ; Boynton v. Boynton, 226 Mass. 454, 165 N. E. 489 (1929). Time when donee
entitled to receive gift: Wurt's Ex'rs v. Page, 19 N. J. Eq. 365 (Ch. 1869).
21. Donnell v. Newburyport Homeopathic Hospital, 179 Mass. 187, 60 N. E. 482
(1901) (gift over after preceding life estate; and gift upon donee's reaching majority,
then gift over).
22. Howard v. Howard's Trustee, 212 Ky. 847, 280 S. W. 156 (1926); Willits v.
Conklin, 88 Neb. 805, 130 N. W. 757, 33 L. R. A. (N.s.) 321 (1911); Massie v.
Jordan, 69 Tenn. 646 (1878); McNish v. Bryan, 2 Tenn. C. C. A. 443 (1911) (life
estate to A held enlarged into fee by happening of those events which prevented the
limitation over from taking effect) ; Stone v. Maney, 3 Tenn. Ch. 731 (1878). Contra:
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 236 Ala. 161, 181 So. 92 (1938). In Harwell v. Benson,
76 Tenn. 344 (1881), where the devise was to A in fee, with gift over to take effect
if A should die before he marry or have any bodily heirs, it was held that the gift over
took effect upon A's death after marriage but before birth of any children.
23. Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 8 L. Ed. 322 (U. S. 1832) ; Schnitter v. McManahan,
85 Neb. 337, 123 N. W. 299, 27 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1047 (1909); Eckhardt v. Phillips,
176 Tenn. 34, 137 S. W. 2d 301 (1940), 16 TENN. L. REv. 479; Hadley v. Hadley, 100
Tenn. 446, 45 S. W. 342 (1898). See ArxnUSON, WILLS § 265 (1937); 28 R. C. L.,
Wills § 173 (1921).
24. Complainants'in the instant case relied on Eckhardt v. Phillips, 176 Tenn. 34.
137 S. W. 2d 301 (1940), where it was held, despite the contrary rule of construction
in Tennessee, that "death without issue" meant death at any time, after as well as before
the testator's death. The context of the will in that case, however, showed that the
testator contemplated the death of the beneficiary after his own death; thus the holding
is based on the testator's intention rather than the "die without issue" rule of con-
struction.
In the instant case the chancellor recognized and affirmed the Tennessee rule of
construction, holding that "by the expression 'if she dies without bodily heirs' . . . the
testator evidently meant that if his said granddaughter should die without bodily heirs
before she obtained possession of the land. . . ." This holding is greatly strengthened by
other circumstances indicating the testator's actual intent. An alternate ground for the
holding was given, that since the donee of the gift over was dead at the time the gift
over should have vested, the gift over failed to take effect. The Tennessee survivorship
statute, TENN. CoDE ANN. § 8134 (Williams, 1934), was held not to be applicable,
since the donee of the gift over died after the testator.
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